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“THE WILD EXPERIMENT” AND ITS AFTERMATH:
HOW COURTS SETTLED CONFLICT AND
QUESTIONS OF POWER IN HIGHER EDUCATION, 1900-1930
Between 1900 and 1930, who determined the balance of power between
higher education and the state when conflicts arose? This study presents an
untold story of how courts settled disputes that stemmed from public officials’
attempts to rein in spending and influence among colleges in their states. These
disputes followed what Frank Blackmar in 1890 referred to as a “wild experiment”
with higher education’s growth and planning. Colleges desired to expand,
acquire additional funding, and function as independently as possible, while
public officials and legislatures sought to exercise influence and power over
those colleges. This laid the groundwork for conflict and a power struggle. In the
absence of coordinating boards, accrediting agencies, and a host of regulations
that we are accustomed to today, courts regulated the balance of power between
states and colleges. Many of the cases covered in this study have not been
discussed in a scholarly setting. This study evaluates twenty-four legal cases to
add another chapter to the early twentieth century history of higher education—
one that highlights conflict and power struggles that helped shape the
relationships between colleges and states during the decades that followed.
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Chapter One:
Introduction, Literature Review, and Methodology
Introduction
Between 1900 and 1930, who determined the balance of power between
higher education and the state when conflicts arose? This study presents an
untold story of how courts settled conflicts that stemmed from public officials’
attempts to rein in spending and influence among colleges in their states. In the
absence of the agencies that we are accustomed to today—state coordinating
boards, accrediting agencies, and federal executive and legislative oversight—it
was left to the courts to regulate the balance of power between states and
colleges. This study presents research that has previously gone undocumented
in the story of higher education’s development in the early 1900s.
The prologue that gave rise to these court cases is important and set the
stage for the conflicts and power struggles that we see documented in these
legal proceedings. Writing for the United States Bureau of Education in 1890,
Frank Blackmar referred to what had occurred with planning and funding in
higher education through the late 1800s as a “wild experiment” (p. 39). If we
consider the revolution that occurred within higher education during the 1800s
due to increased federal and state funding of public higher education, and
particularly by the 1860s due to the federal Morrill Land Grant program, it is easy
to understand why Blackmar used such a colorful descriptor. The “wild
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experiment” and the ensuing landscape has been characterized by historians
such as Clark Kerr (1982) as having created an untidy relationship between
governments and colleges: they “entered into a common-law marriage
unblessed by predetermined policies and self-surveys—but nonetheless formed
a very productive union” (pp. 49-50).
It was this experimentation and lack of formalized or mature policies that
led to a vacuum of certainty about whether states or colleges held the higher
authority in important matters. Critics helped fill the vacuum, arguing that higher
education’s increasing influence was also accompanied by wastefulness and
inefficiency. After all, colleges attracted such a small segment of the population
but enjoyed increasingly generous appropriations via federal grant funds and/or
from state coffers. As this study will show, those critics were often state
constitutional officers—state auditors, treasurers, and attorneys general.
Judging from their actions, they viewed themselves as lobbying on the front lines
to protect limited state treasuries and taxpayers from waste or inefficiencies.
In summary, colleges desired to expand, acquire funding, and function as
independently as possible, while state officials and legislatures sought to
exercise influence and power over those colleges. This was the recipe for
conflict. In a given state, would a college control its own destiny with minimal
state influence, or would the colleges be managed and subjected to oversight by
their respective states? That was the fundamental question that state courts
answered. In doing so, courts became the arbiters of power.
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Research Agenda and Questions
There is a substantial quantity of cases from this time period. From 1900
to 1930, there were 443 reported court cases that involved higher education
(Elliot & Chambers, 1936). The majority of these cases were argued at the state
level rather than in federal courts. These cases cover a wide range of topics—
constitutional autonomy of public institutions, tax-exempt status for private
colleges, social issues, employment and termination disputes, eminent domain
powers, race, and many others. Each of these topics is interesting and
deserving of study. However, this dissertation’s focus on power struggles
between colleges and states necessarily excludes many of those cases. This
study relies on those cases that highlight power-related conflicts between state
entities (usually elected officials or legislatures) and colleges. Chapter Two
explains the selection of cases.
Research questions include:
•

What was the role of courts in determining the balance of power
between higher education and the state when conflicts arose?

•

Were court decisions meaningful either to individual states or to the
national conversation about higher education? In other words, did
these cases matter?

•

Who were the actors in these conflicts?
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•

What lessons are evident about the history of higher education from
studying these cases?

Significance of the Study
The period of 1900 to 1930 was critical for higher education. As
discussed in the literature review section, the period leading up to 1930 is often
characterized by colleges having had limited or uneven intervention from
governments. After all, if one looks for evidence of such intervention, it is natural
to scour historical documents for evidence such as accrediting agencies or
centralized governing boards. Such evidence is limited, suggesting limited
involvement from governments. This study uses a different kind of evidence—
legal cases, which are not utilized frequently—to build a case that many state
officials actually were quite involved with managing—perhaps interfering—with
public colleges. This study enhances the narrative about the time period that
predates the more formal and direct methods of involvement that we have seen
in American higher education for the past few decades.
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Historical Context
The beginning point of this study—the early 1900s—is not arbitrary, as it
represents a time of great change and growth in higher education. Veysey
(1965) discusses at length the changing nature of the American university in the
early 1900s. Thelin (2004) also describes the late 1800s to early 1900s as the
“golden age” of higher education (p. 155). Geiger (2011) notes the increasing
faculties and student enrollments that, combined with an increasingly complex
curriculum and structure, led to the growth of administrative functions. Veysey,
Thelin, and Geiger thus characterize around 1900 as a turning point for higher
education and a sensible beginning point for this study. The ending point of 1930
is used due to the onset of the Great Depression and significant changes in
higher education, which Hill summarized in 1934: “Emergency legislation of
1930-1933 has not only greatly increased the control over institutional finance by
the governors of some states, but has also enlarged the powers of governors to
reorganize the whole administration of higher education” (p. 39). Given the
significant changes that had occurred by 1900 and following 1930, this study
uses those beginning and ending dates as its criteria.
As higher education grew, criticism emerged. Henry Pritchett, president of
the Carnegie Foundation, was one of the industry’s chief critics—or at the very
least, the person with the loudest voice who raised significant questions about its
efficiency. In a 1926 article in the American Law School Review, he noted that,
from 1890 to 1920, “the burden of taxation that has fallen upon the citizens of

5

every state of the Union has grown in an unprecedented fashion” (p. 172).
Describing the higher education system, he wrote, “Inquiries of an exact sort are
now being made to ascertain the cost of the existing school system in various
states, and to ascertain at the same time the sources of taxation whence the
support of the school system comes, and to compile simultaneously a statement
of the legal authorization for these expenditures” (p. 171). He also advocated
efforts “to study…the present and prospective costs involved with special
reference to economics and efficiency of expenditures, the relationship of
educational costs to other necessary governmental expenditures…” (p. 171).
Pritchett’s comments reveal that the experimentation that Blackmar (1890)
discussed was facing new skepticism.
There is also evidence of a growing dissatisfaction with how government
agencies were performing during this period. An article published in 1925 in the
American Bar Association Journal echoed Pritchett’s comments in its discussion
of how the growth in state governments and expenditures had led to great
efficiency problems. The journal quoted Illinois Governor Frank Lowden from
1917, who characterized government in a most unflattering way:
The state has become more complex. Its sphere of action has been
increased. The police power has been extended, and state regulation and
control of matters pertaining to the public health, welfare and safety has
assumed wide and extensive proportions. No occupation, trade or
employment has escaped. A great mass of legislation, much of it
illconsidered, has been enacted. . . Administrative agencies have been
multiplied in bewildering confusion. They have been created without
reference to their ability, economically and effectively to administer the
laws. Our finance administration is chaotic, illogical and confused. . .
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Something goes wrong, and we enact a law and there the matter rests.
We are confronted with a problem requiring solution, and then we pass the
problem on to a commission and felicitate ourselves that we have solved
the problem. Progress is the law of life. The progress needed most now is
progress in administration. . . To meet these obligations, democracy must
show a constantly increasing efficiency in government. That is the test
which we now must meet, and if we do not meet it, democracy is doomed.
(Robinson, 1925, p. 787)
Governor Lowden’s comments, while not directed specifically toward higher
education, supply us with a more thorough view of the landscape. Higher
education, like state governments, had grown significantly in such a short period
of time, and many of the legal cases discussed in this study suggest an attempt,
to use Lowden’s word, to “test” how higher education could be more efficient and
accountable.
Some scholars have noted the additional scrutiny that higher education
endured. Barrow (1990) argues that, due in part to low enrollments in college,
“political support for public higher education was often tenuous and ambivalent at
best. Public college administrators and state legislators were subjected to
conflicting demands for the expansion of public higher educational opportunities
and a hostile popular reaction to its costs” (p. 96). As a result of this scrutiny,
Barrow finds that “continued growth of higher education had to be justified in
terms of its rate of return to the public” (p. 96). As a practical example of this
scrutiny, Barrow notes that the federal Bureau of Education published 126 policyrelated publications between 1902 and 1915, compared to only two such
publications prior to 1901 (pp. 96-97).
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Echoing Barrow’s observations, we also see scrutiny of higher education
building from organized labor. In 1918, the American Federation of Labor
commented on the growth and role of higher education in its convention’s annual
report, stating that it “believes that the upper years of elementary school should
be reorganized to afford diversified training, so that boys and girls who cannot go
on to higher schools, will receive training specifically designed for their needs,
and not be compelled as at present to prepare for a role they will never play” (p.
320). Graham (2005) likewise reflects on the disconnect between higher
education in the early 1900s and what most Americans needed and wanted:
“Not until the 1890s…with the introduction of the Babcock test for milk fat devised
at the University of Wisconsin, did any of the institutions have a useful,
commercially viable product from their efforts. No wonder farmers were reluctant
to send their children to study at these places” (p. 206). In summary, at a time
when public colleges were seeking and/or receiving additional resources and
sought to preserve or expand their autonomy, there were elements within society
that questioned higher education’s relevance.
What are we to make of this historical context? Consider that there was
an increasing focus on efficiency and outcomes combined with skepticism about
whether governments were acting in the best interests of citizens. Now, let us
contrast that to higher education: growing, but still directly benefitting only a
sliver of the population; having received an influx of appropriations from federal
land grant initiatives; asking for more funds from states; and, all the while,
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seeking to preserve its independence. In summary, higher education sought
more resources and greater independence at a time when resources were either
scarce and/or enduring additional scrutiny. This chasm set the stage for many of
the conflicts we see in the court cases presented in this study.
Literature Review
Blackmar’s (1890), The History of Federal and State Aid to Higher
Education in the United States, a publication of the U.S. Bureau of Education,
anticipated the debate that would occur in higher education for the coming few
decades. Blackmar’s notion of the balance of power is different from how we
frame the issue today. Rather than arguing that colleges mismanaged public
funds, he instead found that states’ haphazard approaches to higher education
were ineffective and that states needed to provide additional support, enact more
legislation, and increase funding: “…the lawgivers of new States hastened to
plant universities, which had to pass through long periods of inactivity and
meager support…during which the handling of the funds, in many instances, was
a wild experiment” (pp. 38-39). Blackmar states that the “wild experiment” was
“partly due to the light of experience, and partly to the influence of the
Congressional grant in 1862. There is also to be taken into account the fact that
all of the schools, both private and public, of the South and West are crowded
beyond their capacity; that is, beyond their capacity to furnish a liberal education,
or even to give students what they demand” (pp. 38-39). Furthermore, he
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criticizes legislative action as the source of the problems: “the facts before us
show a vast amount of weak and misdirected legislation in the management of
the funds granted by the Federal Government and the several States for carrying
on institutions of learning. There are exceptions to this generalization, but they
are not abundant” (p. 38). If we accept Blackmar’s contention that legislation
was weak, ineffective, or unclear as higher education approached the beginning
of the twentieth century, it makes more clear why many of the court cases cited
in this study (and beyond this study’s scope) existed.
In the late 1950s, Glenny (1959) assembled one of the first publications
that synthesized how public institutions were coordinated by states, perhaps
recognizing that those relationships had become more complicated. The
publication, Autonomy of Public Colleges: The Challenge of Coordination, was
funded by the Carnegie Foundation. Glenny observed that, in the earlier part of
the century, coordinating boards and similar agencies had been established in
response to primarily two factors: the increasing complexity of higher education
and the increasing size of state government agencies. Higher education was
becoming increasingly complex because, “With increasing urbanization and the
expansion of population …Universities began extensive research programs in the
physical and biological sciences; provided new services for farmers, industries,
and other special-interest groups; added professional schools in new areas such
as social work, public administration, industrial relations, and municipal
management; further specialized in agriculture, medicine, and dentistry; and
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increased course offerings in almost all previously existing academic fields” (p.
13).
Glenny also finds that colleges also became victims of growth: “The
multiplication of institutions, as in Georgia where twenty-six were established,
and the subsequent expansion of programs often exceeded the needs and the
funds of the states and brought financial problems which ambitious legislatures
and boards failed to anticipate. Each institution endeavored to obtain adequate
appropriations by intensive lobbying” (p. 13). Regarding the second reason for
increased coordination (the increasing size of state government), Glenny finds
that the structure and increased funding for state universities paralleled that of
other state projects, such as infrastructure, health, and social programs. Finally,
Glenny writes that the need for coordination of colleges was the result of “the
demands of economy- and efficiency-minded legislatures [searching] for expert
appraisal of relative needs and projected expansion of the several institutions” (p.
17).
Echoing a 1933 Carnegie Foundation report that he cited, Glenny
describes the environment for public institutions as one in which each college
“requests support from the legislature for the programs which it believes
desirable and attempts to obtain as much as possible of the funds available for
higher education,” leading to a “rivalry” among a state’s public colleges (p. 17).
Therefore, coordinating boards/agencies were needed to sort through requests
for funds and to make sure that requests for funding for a program at one
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institution did not unfairly compete with another institution. In summary,
governments wanted to ensure that state funds were being used wisely and
coordinating boards were logical solutions. Glenny’s research in this area is
important not only because it was an early attempt to define the relationships
between universities and states, but also because it helped to frame the reasons
why there was conflict.
Berdahl’s (1971) work echoes many of Glenny’s observations and
provides additional insight into higher education governance at the state level.
He lists states and types of coordinating agencies, with each state’s coordinating
board classified by type: voluntary association, coordinating board, consolidated
governing board, and no state agency. Each agency’s creation year is also
listed. Among the 48 states with coordinating boards when he published his
research in 1971, eleven were established prior to 1930, three between 1931 and
1940, two between 1941 and 1950, eight between 1951 and 1960, and twentyfour between 1961 and 1970 (pp. 34-35). For the sake of this study, it is
noteworthy that less than one-quarter of states had any type of coordinating
board prior to 1930, which is another possible explanation for the cases that we
see.
Like Glenny, Berdahl discusses the history behind why states pursued
coordinating boards. Referring to the late 1800s, he writes, “During this period of
rapid growth, state governments learned that the assumption that lay governing
boards would protect the public interest was only partially correct. Although the

12

lay trustees usually worked conscientiously to avoid wasting public funds, they
were also understandably ambitious for their institutions. Thus they sometimes
advanced proposals for expansion and for new programs which, taken by
themselves, may have been legitimate but which…[exceeded] the state’s
resources or needs” (p. 27). Berdahl’s commentary is important because it
supports the argument that higher education by 1900 was a likely target for
critics.
The arguments outlined by Blackmar, Glenny, and Berdahl overlap and
are generally consistent. Although they (especially Glenny and Berdahl) focus
primarily on coordinating boards and not as much on the larger picture of a
power struggle, their contributions are nonetheless meaningful. However, other
scholars have taken different approaches and reached different conclusions. In
2001, Zumeta published a chapter, Public Policy and Accountability in Higher
Education: Lessons from the Past for the New Millenium, which focuses on the
present state of accountability and provides a historical perspective. He
describes that the period following the Morrill Act was one during which “states
did not generally involve themselves deeply…They were normally satisfied to let
academics decide most policy matters about what to teach and study, who was
qualified to teach and enroll…and how the academic enterprise was organized”
(p. 161). He explains why this was the case: “Why did legislators and governors
leave the internal workings of these public institutions alone for much of their
history? Early on, political leaders tended to be somewhat in awe of highly
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education men. They were very proud of their state’s collegiate creations and
eager to see them develop and achieve greatness” (p. 161). In summary,
Zumeta concluded that state/college conflict is generally a modern phenomenon
and that there was a hands-off approach from policymakers.
One recent scholar who addresses the higher education power struggle in
the early 1900s is McClendon (2008). As a result of many public universities
being established in the late 1800s (resulting in part from the Morrill Act), states
became more cognizant of governance issues by the early 1900s. McClendon
points out that Florida was the first state to establish a governing board in 1905,
and that, “By 1932, higher education in twelve states had been organized in a
centralized manner through the creation of a single governing board for all
institutions” (p. 65). McClendon also reports how the Carnegie Foundation
conducted a number of studies during the 1930s that reflected upon changes in
governance, and said that such studies were “ignored in many late-century [late
twentieth century] commentaries on American campus-state relations” (p. 65). In
a separate article, McClendon, Hearn, and Deaton (2006) contrast the
accountability environment of the twenty-first century with an earlier era during
which “accountability often referred to the design of statewide governance
structures capable of accommodating the simultaneous need for institutional
autonomy and external oversight of campus decision-making. The central
question…was: Precisely which activities and functions of public colleges and
universities (e.g., academic programs, budgets, tuition setting, and so forth)
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should be dictated by the state and which should be left to the discretion of
campuses?” (p. 1). Many of the cases presented in this study revolve around or
are closely related to that central question.
Novak and Leslie (2000) also address some elements of state/college
conflicts. They write about some of the Carnegie publications that McClendon,
Hearn, and Deaton (2006) describe above and characterize those publications as
having been ignored by scholars. Those Carnegie reports, which reflected upon
state coordination of higher education and financial issues, were key studies of
what was still an early history of higher education structures. Novak and Leslie
argue that such studies resulted from “the nation’s Depression-era fiscal crisis”
and that they sought to answer questions such as whether higher education
could become more efficient with the spending of public funds (p. 58). They find
that colleges “faced unprecedented scrutiny” due to severe budget shortfalls (p.
56). Although limited in scope, Novak and Leslie’s finding that tight budgets led
organizations like Carnegie to ask questions about colleges’ management and
efficiencies is important.
In summary, previous scholarship indicates that there was a recipe for
conflict between colleges and states in the early 1900s. This research is still
fairly underdeveloped, however, which some scholars have acknowledged. This
study will show that a significant piece of evidence missing from scholarship is a
discussion of court cases. There were clearly important issues facing higher
education around 1900. With only a handful of states establishing coordinating
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boards, the existence of few accrediting agencies, and limited federal oversight,
the courts became the entities that considered and answered important
questions about higher education.
Legal Analysis as History
Using legal cases to improve our understanding of higher education has
been embraced by a number of scholars. Elliott and Chambers (1936) published
what was likely the first anthology of higher education legal cases and supplied
updates until the 1970s. Chambers (1952) describes the study of legal cases as
being designed to “provide proof of the never-ending problem of adjusting the
scope, controls, and operations of our colleges and universities to the
complicated and changing conditions of modern democratic life” (p. v). Several
other higher education legal anthologies have followed—Alexander and
Solomon’s (1972) College and University Law, Edwards and Nordin’s (1979)
Higher Education and the Law, and more recent publications such as Olivas’
(2015) The Law and Higher Education. In these publications, one can easily find
examples of how case law is used to supply information about the past and
present state of higher education.
That being said, these publications tend to be written with a managerial
perspective in mind rather than a historical perspective. That is, scholars aspire
to educate the reader about the results of legal cases so that the reader can be
more informed when encountering particular legal issues in academia. This
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dissertation embraces the methodology of several higher education legal authors
with its focus on case law but differs from them in a number of ways. This study
focuses solely on those cases decided between 1900 and 1930, attends to the
issue of how courts regulated power between states and public institutions, and
is designed to show how these patterns of power struggles shaped higher
education in ways that have previously gone undocumented. Using legal cases
to construct a narrative has been endorsed by several scholars. For example,
Russo (1996) reflects upon case law research as a method that can greatly
enhance our understanding of higher education. Alder’s (1996) suggestions
regarding how to proceed with research in this area were also valuable.
How Cases Were Selected
In 1936, Edward Elliott (president of Purdue University) and M.M.
Chambers (staff member of the American Youth Commission of the American
Council on Education) published what was likely the first book on higher
education law: The Colleges and the Courts: Judicial Decisions Regarding
Institutions of Higher Education in the United States. In the Appendix, Elliott and
Chambers list 443 cases organized by state that dealt with higher education that
had been ruled on by federal and state courts from 1900 to 1930. Many more
cases fall outside of this time frame. This list of 443 cases was the starting point
for this study.
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These 443 cases cover many types of litigation: governance conflicts,
employment issues, disagreements about donations, student grades, the
legitimacy of degrees (diploma mills), racial tensions, and many others. This
study explores how case law helps fill in gaps in our understanding of how power
questions were settled from 1900 to 1930 between public institutions and states.
As such, this study focuses only on a selection of cases that explore that very
issue—that is, how questions of power were settled between states and colleges.
The 443 cases were reviewed based on case summaries and actual court
decisions using Lexis Nexis. Using the narrow definition stated above, 43 cases
emerged whose criteria fit the study. Each of those cases was reviewed more
thoroughly. Some cases, such as those within the same state and with
overlapping themes, were generally excluded, leading to a selection of twentyfour cases.
The selected cases are not homogeneous. Although they all address
power struggles between states and colleges, the themes are quite different.
Cases involve themes such as student scholarships, curricular issues, the
expenditure of land grant funds, the propriety of different types of expenditures,
and several others. In addition, the cases represent a variety of outcomes—
some favor colleges, some favor states, and others have mixed results. In
summary, even within the narrow confines of discussing power disputes, there is
a wide range of topics and legal outcomes.
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Although the cases address a number of different issues, this study
classifies each case into one of three categories or themes: financial controls,
management of federal funds, and other governance issues. These
classifications are admittedly imperfect, and some cases could legitimately be
included in more than one category. In fact, it becomes apparent when reading
these cases that they—much like any other dramatic events that we experience
in higher education—rarely are only about one issue. However, categorizing the
cases hopefully makes the reading experience less daunting and aids in the
identification of overlapping themes among the various cases.
Evaluating these twenty-four cases from among eighteen states allows us
to identify patterns and themes. The narrative presented for each case answers
the following questions: (1) who were the major players in the litigation, (2) what
was the source of the disagreement between/among the parties involved, (3)
what issues did the court consider when making its decision, (4) what was the
court’s ultimate decision, and (5) what was the case’s significance?
Cases are listed in Appendix A.
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Chapter Two: Case Findings and Discussion

This study’s review of each of the twenty-four selected cases will discuss
the following elements regarding each case: the major players, the source of the
conflict, a summary of each party’s arguments, the outcome, the reasoning
behind the court’s decision, and the implications for the balance of power
between the state and colleges. Because of each case’s complexities, the
following discussions necessarily will vary in terms of length and depth. This
analysis is not intended to elaborate on each case’s every detail, but instead will
focus on facts that illustrate each case’s importance and relevance to higher
education. The order of the cases follows the outline described in Appendix A.

20

Section 1: The Power to Control Public Institution Finances

The Indiana State Board of Finance et al. v. State of Indiana, ex rel.
Trustees of Purdue University (188 Ind. 36, 1919)
Although the legal issue in this case technically addressed Purdue
University’s eligibility to receive certain tax revenues, the underlying issue in this
case was whether the state’s tax policy could extend to the public university’s
entities that were funded by federal sources. The discord between the Indiana
State Board of Finance and Purdue followed a legislative act in 1913 that
provided tax revenue to Purdue along with some other state institutions. The act
stipulated that, “’When the funds provided for by this act for said educational
institutions shall become available, said funds shall constitute the total amounts
to be paid out of the treasury of the state to said institutions for any purpose,
thereafter, and all acts and parts of acts in conflict with this provision are hereby
repealed’” (p. 4). In summary, the legislature’s act cancelled all other related
taxes and revenues that the university had received in the past, so any future
revenues due to university from the state would exclusively derive from the tax
revenues specified in this new legislative act.
The conflict arose when the state’s Board of Finance and the governor
acted to cancel Purdue’s appropriation for its Agricultural Research Bureau and
Agricultural Experiment Station. The Research Bureau received $30,000 in
annual appropriations, while Experiment Station received $75,000 per year.
Those appropriations, so argued the Board of Finance and the governor, were
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voided following the legislature’s passage of the aforementioned law. The
university countered that these two ancillary agricultural stations were not a core
of the university’s mission and therefore not directly related to the university and
its funding mechanisms. As such, it argued that those stations’ funding should
not be impacted by the legislation.
To arrive at its decision, the court considered agricultural stations’ history
and their prior funding model. The court stated, “[The issue] cannot be fully
understood without reading in connection therewith the history of the financial
provisions for maintenance of the university…and for the maintenance of several
special bureaus stations or departments” (p. 4). This indicated that the court
wished to dig more deeply to understand the complex nature of how the
university and its affiliates had been funded. The court observed that the source
of this particular conflict was rooted in a “[f]ailure to observe the distinction”
between a university’s traditional departments and affiliated entities such as the
Agricultural Research Bureau and the Agricultural Experiment Station.
The court found that “[h]aving given careful consideration to such history…
the university proper has been maintained to a large extent by appropriations or
taxes for general and current expenses and for general maintenance, while
another and distinct line of appropriations has been made not for such
maintenance, but, by express limitations, separated from such maintenance and
confined to special purposes and departments” (p. 4). Those “special purposes
and departments” included the Research Bureau and Experiment Station. In
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addition, the court noted that “the board of trustees of the university had nothing
to do with this appropriation” for the two entities (p. 4). The court found many
other examples of how the two stations were not completely connected to Purdue
University, finding that Purdue’s trustees were only tangentially involved in
overseeing the stations’ activities and finances and that the employees of these
stations were not actually Purdue employees. The court considered all of this
evidence and found that, “the trustees, or the treasurer of the university, are only
designated as agents for the specific purpose of holding such special funds, and
are not acting in their general capacity as officials of the university. A prohibition
of payment to the university of other than the tax, for any purpose, does not
prevent a payment to the trustees as such special agents” (pp. 5-6). In
summary, the court made a distinction between a university and a university’s
affiliates and found that they cannot be treated as the same with this type of
legislation.
In addition, this case addressed the state’s power to control a university’s
federal funds. The original tax legislation exempted land grant funds from being
cancelled as a result of the new tax’s implementation, meaning that the university
could continue to receive both land grant revenues as well as the new state tax
revenue. Although its funds were safe, the university nonetheless asked the
court to consider whether the state had power over the funds and whether it was
even necessary for the legislation to specify an exemption for federal funds. The
university contended that, “federal appropriations belong to the university and are
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not subject to repeal by legislative acts of the state” (p. 8). Conversely, the state’s
Department of Finance argued that the state had the power to repeal its
acceptance of the federal funds. Although there was no practical or immediate
implication, the court found that “said federal appropriations may be destroyed by
some act of the state, and that there was occasion for a declaration preventing
the tax act from affecting the same” (p. 9). Why is this element of the case
important? First, the conversation demonstrates uncertainty regarding how
federal and state funds would be intermingled—a question that occurred
frequently with these selected cases. Second, it is also important that the court
clarified that although the state legislature does not necessarily have the power
to micromanage federal funds, it does retain the power to cancel them.
Barker, President, et al. v. Crum, et al., 177 Ky. 637 (1917)
Barker is one of the few cases selected that involves a student litigant.
The student, Crum, sued Henry Stites Barker, the president of the Kentucky
Agricultural and Mechanical College, now the University of Kentucky. Although
the student was the plaintiff, the case’s central theme was the conflict between
the legislature’s powers and the college’s independence. However, it was not
simply a conflict between a legislature and one college, but was a case that
impacted the futures of all public institutions of higher education in the state.
At the heart of the suit was a law that the legislature passed in 1908 that
initiated a new scholarship program at the college. It stipulated that, “’Each
county in each state, in consideration of the incomes accruing to said
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institution…[shall] be entitled to select and send to said university each year one
or more properly prepared students…free from all charges for tuition,
matriculation fees, room rent, fuel and lights…[and] shall also be entitled to their
necessary traveling expenses” (p. 3). Each county was eligible to send at least
one student, and more students depending on its population size. The law also
specified that the students would be selected as follows: “selection…shall be
made by the superintendents of common schools in their respective counties,
upon competitive examination, on subjects prepared by the faculty of the
university” and that the exam would be coordinated by a board of examiners (p.
3). The law is noteworthy for a few reasons. First, the notion that colleges were
expected to repay counties due to the tax revenue they (or, more accurately,
their residents) supplied is unusual. In this research, there are no other
examples of legislatures that established an overt link between a municipality’s
residents’ payment of taxes and receiving something tangible in return from a
state institution. Second, the scope of student expenses that the law covered
was very generous. Third, although there is some deference to the college’s
faculty regarding establishing criteria by which students were tested, it is clear
that the student selections were made locally, and thus were mostly out of the
hands of the college.
In supporting the county scholarship program, the students made four
arguments that the law was valid, three of which were important to higher
education. The students argued that (1) the law “is the result of a contract
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between the state and the various counties…in consideration of the levying of a
tax to support the college, certain selected students from each county can attend
free of the charges in question,” (2) that the legislature’s power to establish
colleges necessarily meant that it was “given discretion as to the manner in
which it should be conducted, and who should attend it,” (3) the students
constituted a class to which certain regulations should not apply, and (4) “that the
statute will be upheld under the doctrine of contemporaneous construction” (p. 4).
The court was persuaded by none of the students’ arguments and fully
supported the university’s claims about the illegality of the law. Regarding the
county taxation, the court observed, “We have not…been referred to any facts
existing between the state and the counties which constitute a contract…And,
indeed, there is no claim that any formal contract was made or attempted” (p. 6).
The court added that if there had been an agreement by which “special
privileges” had been given to the counties in return for their taxes, the state
constitution would have rendered them void (p. 6).
Second, the court addressed whether the legislature could control how
colleges spent their funds. The court looked to the state constitution and found
that it “merely declares that the tax then levied for the endowment and
maintenance of…[the college] should remain until changed by law. It made no
declaration as to the expenditure of the money so raised” (p. 6).
Third, the students had argued to become categorized as a special class
of citizens because the state constitution generally prevented the expenditure of
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public funds for individuals. The university argued that scholarships were not
legal because of this constitutional prohibition. The court agreed, stating that the
scholarship program provided an unfair advantage to selected students: the
students are “selected by the county superintendent, and the fortunate students
thus arbitrarily selected are given money from the state treasury while others who
have likewise passed the required examination are required to pay their fees and
traveling expenses” (p. 6).
Fourth, the court addressed the contemporaneous construction
argument—the idea that the statute had been in place and followed for several
years, therefore it should continue as a valid practice: “when a statute conflicts
with a plain provision of the constitution the rule of contemporaneous
construction is not applicable; otherwise it would mean that a violation of the
constitution would be upheld providing it had continued long enough to give it
dignity. The statute which violates the constitution is never effective for any
purpose; it can not be made constitutional by repeated violations of the
instrument” (p. 7). This argument can be found in other cases in this study, and
courts ruled similarly—that if an act is not constitutional, it cannot be held
constitutional simply because it has not been challenged in the past.
With this decision, the court made critical decisions that impacted the
balance of power and the development of higher education in Kentucky. It
dispelled the idea that municipalities should necessarily expect something in
return for their funding of higher education. The court also clarified that higher
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education’s decision-making and policy-making was independent of influence
from government. The court’s declaration that the constitution only established a
funding mechanism for higher education, but that it did not specify the authority
over that funding, further solidified higher education’s independence and power.
This is particularly important because the constitution did not specifically grant
colleges’ independence from legislative interference, but the court inferred it
nonetheless.
The court’s finding regarding the constitutionality of providing scholarships
to students is intriguing. Clearly, this is a finding that no longer deters Kentucky
colleges from providing scholarships in modern times, and that evolution is
beyond the scope of this study. Nonetheless, it appears that the court’s decision
was intended to have a democratizing effect on higher education—that is, the
court did not want students to be given preference with scholarship funding
ostensibly due to a student’s local connections within a given county. Finally, the
court’s declaration that contemporaneous construction should not apply in this
case may initially appear to be an esoteric legal distinction that is less important
to higher education than it is to constitutional law. However, if we consider that
higher education in the state was still relatively young, the idea that higher
education must be guided by specific laws and policies was certainly an
important precedent.
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Bosworth, Auditor, v. State University, et al. (154 Ky. 370, 1913)
Kentucky’s supreme court, like its ruling in Barker, made similarly
important decisions in Bosworth. The court considered two issues critical to the
future of higher education in the state. The first was whether a college may
employ its own attorney rather than the state attorney general. The second issue
addressed appropriations and whether a college’s subsequent appropriations for
a project necessarily canceled previous appropriations. Although the two issues
appear to be distinct, they are actually tied together very closely in this case.
The case originated due to the state auditor’s refusal to authorize money
that the legislature had appropriated. The money was designated for an
agricultural experiment station at the State University. The details of his refusal
will follow, but court first addressed a challenge by the state attorney general who
claimed that the college was forbidden from hiring its own attorney. In this case,
the attorney general supported the auditor’s position; if the college had been
unable to hire outside counsel, its ability to challenge the auditor would have
been significantly curbed, if not altogether impossible. The attorney general
relied on state statutes which stipulated that, “’The Attorney General and his
assistants shall attend to all litigation and business in or out of the State…and no
State officer, board or trustees or the head of any department of institution of the
State shall have authority to employ or to be represented by another other
counsel or attorney-at-law” (pp. 2-3). If a state agency wished to hire its own
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counsel, the statute required that it receive permission from the attorney general
in writing.
Such a requirement, if valid, would have presented quite a conundrum for
the college. It needed legal counsel for advice and to move the case through the
proper court channels. The court ruled that, “The purpose of this provision is to
protect the State or any department or institution of the Statue from having to pay
counsel fees…But it was not the purpose of the statute to prevent an institution of
the State from bringing a suit to test its right when the Attorney General was
unwilling to employ other counsel. In this case the Attorney General represents
the Auditor, and it was not the purpose of the statute to prevent such a suit as
this being brought” (p. 3). Therefore, the university was permitted to continue its
litigation against the state auditor.
The remaining major issue—the validity of the act that expanded
agricultural station funding—is one that the court addressed decisively. The
auditor contended that the legislation that expanded the agricultural station in
1912 was so similar to an act passed in 1910 that the 1912 act was actually an
amendment to the 1910 act. If that had been so, the 1912 legislation would have
been void because state law prohibited such amendments. To be legitimate,
such laws had to stand on their own and be published as their own laws. The
court noted that the 1910 act and 1912 act were quite dissimilar. The 1910 act
was, “’An act to establish a plant for the preparation of hog cholera serum and for
the distribution of same to the farmers of the State,’” although the act did mention
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the agricultural experiment station as the facility where the serum would be
manufactured (p. 3). By comparison, the 1912 act was intended “’to benefit the
Agricultural Experiment Station…appropriating money and providing revenues for
the maintenance of said Experiment Station and for conducting experiments in
the various lines of Agriculture, and to meet the increased demands made upon it
as a public institution” (p. 3). In other words, the 1910 act had a very narrow
focus, whereas the 1912 act authorized a significantly broader scope for how the
station would be funded and for its mission. The court concluded, “The act of
1912 is in no sense an amendment of the act of 1910. It enlarges the
Agricultural Experiment station, but it does not revise the act of 1910” (p. 3).
In this case, the auditor and attorney general sought to rein in the power of
the university. Imagine the implications if the court had sided with the attorney
general—the attorney general could have undermined public higher education’s
power to challenge matters with which the attorney general did not agree or was
unwilling or unable to provide his office’s resources. It could have represented a
dramatic shift in power. In this particular case, the state auditor would have been
able to void the expansion of the agricultural station without the risk of being
challenged. It would have resulted in a chilling effect on the independence of
public higher education in the state.
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Board of Regents of the University of Michigan v. Auditor General (167
Mich. 444, 1911)
In the first sentence of its opinion, the Michigan Supreme Court quickly
summarized the issue: “the court is asked to decide whether the judgment of the
auditor general or that of the board of regents shall prevail respecting the
expenditure of moneys appropriated for the use and maintenance of the
University” (p. 4). The moneys referred to in this case were income tax revenues
collected by the state for the purpose of funding universities. This case explored
several issues that were critical for determining the balance of power in
Michigan’s higher education system.
The conflict arose when the state’s auditor general reviewed the
university’s monthly request for tax revenue funds. The established process
involved the university submitting detailed records that demonstrated its eligibility
for the funds, after which point the auditor would authorize the payment of funds.
The law stipulated that the funds should be “for the use and maintenance of the
University of Michigan” (p. 4).
The expenditures at issue are interesting because they illuminate how
college presidents were spending their time. They totaled $557 and covered the
following: “traveling expenses of Dr. Angell, president of the University, in
attending alumni meetings and inaugurations of presidents of other universities,
and for traveling expenses of other members of the faculty and officers…in
attending intercollegiate meetings and conferences…and for the expenses of
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instructors in accompanying students in inspecting mechanical engineering
plants” (p. 4). The auditor general argued that these expenses “were not for the
use and maintenance of the University…and consequently not for lawful
purposes under the accounting laws of this State” (p. 4).
Upon reviewing these records from the previous month, the auditor
general refused to release any additional revenues to the university “for the
reason that certain vouchers made by the regents for prior expenditures, which in
his opinion were unlawful, had not been audited and allowed by him” (p. 4).
There are three legal issues implicit in the auditor general’s argument: (1) that
he had the power to review such expenditures, (2) that he had the power to
determine the propriety of the expenditures, and (3) he had the power to withhold
future disbursements of tax revenues to the university if he disapproved of any
submissions.
Regarding the first issue, the court cites statutes that outline the fact that
the auditor general did retain such authority: “’Such…receipts, when received by
the auditor general, shall be examined by him, and if found correct shall be so
endorsed by him; and all vouchers for expenditures, so far as the amount thereof
shall appear to be for lawful purposes, he shall audit” (p. 5). Some courts could
easily have ruled in favor of the auditor general given the statute’s clarity.
However, the court instead relied on the constitution’s language regarding higher
education, which states, “the board of regents is made the highest form of juristic
person known to the law, a constitutional corporation of independent authority,
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which, within the scope of its functions, is co-ordinate with and equal to that of
the legislature” (p. 6). As such, even though the law permitted—in fact,
required—the auditor general to audit and question such records, the constitution
ultimately voided his ability to audit university expenses.
On the second issue, because the university controlled its own finances,
the court did not comment on the propriety of the expenses. It did, however, cite
statutes that affirmed the auditor’s ability to withhold future revenues from an
agency if it had failed to satisfy audit requirements. But, the court again noted
that higher education held a special place in Michigan and clarified the auditor
general’s powers—or lack thereof—in his attempt to control higher education: “In
this case, as in many others, his duties are purely ministerial. As against the
discretion of the regents in expenditure of the University funds he exercises no
judicial functions. As to him…vouchers for expenditures made within the amount
of the appropriation, when authorized by the board of regents and properly
authenticated by the duly constituted officials, are, within the meaning of the law,
‘for lawful purposes’” (p. 6).
We should take note of this case’s implications. In practicality, it meant
that the regents ostensibly set their own laws. Of course, it is more complicated
than that, but if we consider that the auditor general expressed legitimate
objections to the university’s expenditures and that he was authorized by law to
review those expenses, the court’s ruling is condemning of his or any other
elected official’s power compared to that of the university. Clearly, the auditor’s
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third contention about his ability to withhold future funds was irrelevant since he
retained so little power to raise questions about university expenditures.
This ruling’s implications for the state and its university system are
obviously compelling, and Michigan is known for having strong constitutional
provisions for higher education (Hutchens, 2007). The regents, within reason
and unless a constitutional change occurred, had free reign to determine their
own destiny and that of their public institutions. That it was affirmed with such
clear and strong language by a court is also important. It left very little room for
elected officials to hold the university system accountable, which likely created
conflicts even beyond those documented in these court cases, particularly as we
consider that this was a time when (as discussed in the introduction) states
attempted to become more frugal and were concerned with processes and
efficiency.
State Board of Agriculture v. Auditor General (180 Mich. 349, 1914)
As we consider the strong support for the Michigan public university
system in Board of Regents, one might expect the Michigan legislature and
elected officers to have stayed away from further controversy. Although it is
speculative, we might view the State Board of Agriculture case as an outgrowth
of frustrations that the legislature felt with how powerful the university system
was becoming.
In 1913, the Michigan legislature acted to establish an additional revenue
source (property taxes) that was designed to help fund public higher education—
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specifically the state’s agricultural college. The case documents do not
specifically state the amount of the revenues, but it is implied that they would
total approximately $600,000 (p. 4). The new source of funds carried a caveat,
however. In exchange for accepting the funds, the college of agriculture was
forced to limit its annual spending to $35,000 for the mechanical and engineering
department. Court documents show that for the preceding fiscal year, “there was
expended $27,000 for supplies, machinery, and maintenance of buildings, and
about $34,000 for salaries of professors and instructors” (p. 3). Therefore, even
the prior year’s expenditures were far out of compliance with—nearly twice the
amount of—the $35,000 maximum requirement. The $35,000 requirement is
further complicated by the fact that much of the department’s funding originated
from federal grant sources.
The court considered whether the legislature indeed knew what it was
doing when it passed this requirement given that the $35,000 figure appears
arbitrary. The court even remarked that, “no reading and no analysis of the
language employed leaves one entirely certain of the meaning of this provision”
(p. 4). A comment made by the auditor general’s attorney suggests that there is
much more to this story; he referred to this provision and its relevance in
determining “whether the agricultural college shall continue as a competitor
against another institution maintained at State expense” (p. 2). Putting together
the pieces of this argument and the facts, we may assume that the legislature
wanted the college of agriculture’s mechanical and engineering department to
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disappear nearly or completely so that it did not threaten another public
institution.
The court discussed the details of the $35,000 requirement and the
complicating factors of the external land grant funds but ultimately considered
them immaterial. By imposing the $35,000 limitation on the mechanical and
engineering department’s expenditures, the court stated that “its effect would be
legislative supervision of the college. To determine that a department of the
college which has maintained at a cost of $60,000 annually…shall be from a
given date maintained at a cost of $35,000 annually….is to determine that it shall
have fewer supplies, or fewer, or less capable, instructors, or both” (p. 5). The
court relied again on the constitutional provisions that provided authority to public
colleges in these matters: “The Constitution has given to the relator the general
supervision of the college and the direction and control of all agricultural college
funds. So long as the relator employs them for the purposes intended by the
grant, it is beyond the power of the legislature to control the relator’s use of the
funds received from the Federal government and long ago appropriated to the
agricultural college” (p. 5).
Although this case’s implications may not appear as wide-ranging as the
earlier Board of Regents decision, they are nonetheless critical. In the prior
case, the court’s ruling addressed a direct challenge to the public university’s
autonomy. In State Board of Agriculture, the challenge was much less direct, but
it was still an attempt to assert power. By being closed to the possibility of even

37

this type of interference, the court effectively emasculated the legislature’s
attempts to establish power over the public colleges.
State Ex Rel. University of Minnesota and Others v. Ray P. Chase, 175
Minn. 259 (1928)
Chase is a case in which the court was clear about power being the
central issue and the reason for the conflict. The court faced a critical question—
would the power to control the Minnesota university system rest with the regents
or with the legislature and governor? In 1851, the state’s constitution was written
such that, in the court’s words, “the Board of Regents, in the management of the
university, is constitutionally independent of all other executive authority” (p. 2).
The state university system operated with this understanding for several
decades, until the legislature passed a statute in 1925 that was intended to
centralize and streamline the operations and finances of state agencies. As a
result of the act, power and decision-making would be centralized within a
Commission of Administration and Finance, with its members appointed by the
governor with senate approval. The governor was also permitted to “remove any
member of the commission at any time without cause,” which clearly provided
him a new avenue to control higher education’s administrative and financial
operations (p. 3). As discussed in Chapter 1, this was a time when many states
were attempting to become more efficient, so it is unsurprising that the Minnesota
legislature took this action. The court even characterized the statute as a
“reorganization of state government” (p. 4).
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The case was initiated soon after the law’s passage, when Ray Chase, the
state auditor, refused to pay an expense that the University of Minnesota
incurred related to establishing group insurance for university employees. The
court considered two separate but related issues: did the statute apply to the
University of Minnesota and, if so, was the statute valid?
In considering the first question, the court established whether a state
university is a state agency under the statute. The statute’s language led to
uncertainty regarding whether it even applied to higher education. The court
summarized the statute with this description: the Commission of Administration
and Finance “’claims authority to supervise and control the expenditure of any
and all moneys’ by or for the university; ‘the making of all contracts’ by the
several officers, departments, and agencies” and that, “’All of said departments
and all officials and agencies of the state government shall be subject to this act’”
(p. 3). Upon review of the statute’s language, the court found that it was
intended to apply to higher education, as education was “in the ordinary and
functional sense, plainly an agency of the state” (p. 3). This finding is an
important one, but not altogether surprising because it clarified that, despite any
claims of independence, the university still is a state entity that is impacted by
laws passed by the legislature.
Because the court established that the statute was applicable to the
University of Minnesota, it proceeded to determine the statute’s constitutionality.
The court saw this case not just as a technical constitutional question, but was
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also clear that it viewed this case as one that addressed critical questions of
power: “On the surface of things, the contest is between the Board of Regents
and the Commission of Administration and Finance…But the real issue is
between the regents and the governor…The right to control finances is the power
to dictate academic policy and direct every institutional activity…[The act has
made] the governor, the final arbiter of all university affairs” (p. 3). The court
relied on the state’s original constitutional language to guide its decision, finding
that the state constitution clearly gave the power to govern the institution to its
regents: “the regents were made a ‘body corporate’ with power to govern. That
is the power to control…the regents were both the [university’s] sole members
and the governing board…the people of the state, speaking through their
constitution, have invested the regents with a power of management of which no
legislature may deprive them” (pp. 4-5).
The result is not only compelling, but so are the court’s statements against
the state auditor’s arguments. The auditor had maintained that the constitution
did not even apply to the University of Minnesota because it (the constitution)
had specified that the regents were to manage the corporation of higher
education. The auditor attempted to draw a distinction between a corporation
and an institution—suggesting that even if the whole of higher education within
the state deserved autonomy, an individual institution did not. The court
dismissed this argument, describing it as “ingenious” but also “not altogether
clear” (p. 4). Despite the court’s easy dismissal, the fact that a state
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constitutional officer made this argument illustrates an important divide between
what the auditor saw as the university’s role and how the university viewed itself.
The auditor also embraced the argument of “practical construction,” which
the court said “has so much factual basis that it deserves special attention” (p. 7).
The auditor referred to instances when, for example, the legislature had revised
the makeup of the board of regents and the university failed to object. In another
example, the legislature established a new board to oversee certain financial
matters, such as building construction, again without objection from the
university. If these acts had gone without challenge from the university, so the
auditor argued, why should this statute be any different? The court admitted that
there was indeed “abundant ammunition for the argument of practical
construction” (p. 7). However, it found that practical construction could not apply
in this case: “A practical construction of anything written—constitution, statue, or
contract—is but an aid to interpretation, not to be resorted to unless such an aid
is required…All the circumstances must be considered which go to make clear
sense of the words. But when that sense is made or becomes plain, the process
of interpretation ends” (p. 7). In essence, the court found that legislative
improvisation—particularly with an industry as new at the time as higher
education—was appropriate, but only when the constitution did not provide
specific guidance.
Whereas most court decisions primarily address the legal merits of a given
case, the Minnesota court also described its philosophical basis for the decision

41

and made clear that the university should win not only on a narrow legal
interpretation, but because protecting higher education from political influence
was the morally just action to take. The court said that the constitution “put the
management of the greatest educational institution beyond the dangers of
vacillating policy, ill informed or careless meddling and partisan ambition that
would be the case of management by either legislature of executive, chosen at
frequent intervals…and because of qualities and activities vastly different from
those which qualify for the management of an institution of higher education” (p.
8). In summary, the court viewed the notion that a higher education institution or
system could be taken over by political forces as inherently dangerous.
Lincoln University v. George E. Hackmann, Auditor (295 Mo. 118, 1922)
This case addressed university finance issues and the legislature’s power
to make appropriations. In 1921, the Missouri legislature passed a law that
impacted the Lincoln Institute, a historically black college. “The act changed the
name of Lincoln Institute to Lincoln University, vested the control thereof in a
board of curators…[and provided money] to purchase additional land and erect
necessary buildings” (p. 3). The amount of funding that the legislature
designated for this purpose was $500,000. The legislation stipulated that the
$500,000 be paid out of funds that had not already been appropriated to the
public school systems in the state.
When the new Lincoln University submitted a bill from an architect
charged with designing new facilities, the state auditor, George Hackmann,
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rejected the expense. His refusal was based on his claim that “no portion of the
public school funds or moneys was unappropriated at that time, and, therefore,
there were no funds out of which to pay this requisition” (p. 3). The question of
whether the funds were actually “unappropriated” was a technical one. The
auditor maintained that the legislature had indeed appropriated funds for the
public school system, but that the funds had simply not all been designated for
the individual counties. In other words, it was technically impossible for an
appropriation from the legislature not to be fully appropriated; instead, an
appropriation may be undesignated. The court stated that “we have no doubt
that the word ‘unappropriated’ was used inadvertently and should be rejected” (p.
4). The court went on to say that, “We have held that in construing an act of the
Legislature, words may be inserted or substituted when necessary to effect the
manifest intention of the framers thereof” (p. 4). If we take what the court said in
those statements, it seems logical that the court would agree with the
university—that the legislature clearly intended to provide the $500,000 to the
university, but that the writers who composed the legislation were innocently
careless with their terminology.
However, the court identified another problem with the legislation. If the
funds for Lincoln were to be paid from the school fund—even if the
aforementioned issue with the appropriation was resolved—it would still be
unconstitutional. The court argued that the constitution required that any funds
appropriated for the public school system could be used only for that purpose,
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with the exception that they could be used to support the University of Missouri.
The court subsequently ruled that the “Legislature was without power to divert or
appropriate any portion thereof to any use or purpose other than establishing and
maintaining the free public schools and the State University…[Lincoln Institute] is
not a part of the free public school system” (p. 5). The court clarified that any
appropriation must be “made out of the general revenue in the State Treasury”
(p. 5). In this sense, the court disagreed with the attorney general, who assumed
that since, “’Lincoln University is a part of the public school system of the State, it
would seem that the Legislature has the same right to direct the application of a
portion of the public school funds to its support that it had to direct the application
of a portion of the same fund to the support of rural high schools’” (p. 4). As the
court disagreed with the attorney general’s interpretation of what was considered
to be part of the free public school system, it ruled that the university was not
authorized to spend the $500,000.
Knowing the auditor’s and court’s true justifications behind their actions is
difficult. Certainly, the auditor did not make a decision that is unlike those of
other state auditors in this study. The court’s reluctance to enforce the
legislature’s intent and its ignoring the attorney general’s assumption about
Lincoln University being a part of the public school system—and thus eligible for
the appropriation—may lead a researcher to ask if the court was swayed
exclusively by the law or if its motivation was more sinister. In other words, did
the court rule based on legal precedent or based on an animosity toward a
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historically black institution receiving such a generous appropriation? It is
unlikely that this question is answerable. The benefit of viewing this case in the
context of other cases is that we see a pattern of state officials questioning
expenditures, so in this study it does not seem out of the norm.
Agricultural and Mechanical College v. B.R. Lacy, State Treasurer (130 N.C.
364, 1902)
This case involves a state treasurer’s questioning the validity of funding for
a historically black college. In 1891, the North Carolina legislature established
the Agricultural and Mechanical College for the Colored Race. Between 1891
and 1902 when the court case occurred, the legislature made regular
appropriations for the college for construction as well as ongoing maintenance
and operating costs. The court considered a challenge by the state treasurer
who claimed that two separate legislative appropriations were not intended to be
cumulative but rather that the most recent appropriation cancelled the previous
appropriation.
The legislature passed the initial appropriation mentioned in the case in
1891: “’the sum of $2,500 is hereby annually appropriated to the said college,
and the Treasurer of the State is hereby authorized and directed to pay the said
amount’” (p. 1). The legislature, which passed biennial budgets, made $5,000
appropriations for 1893-94, 1895-96, and 1897-98. (Court documents do not
mention 1899-1900, so it is unclear whether this was an omission in court
records or if the state failed to make an appropriation for that biennium.) In 1901-
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02, the legislature specified that, “’$5,000 be appropriated to the Colored
Agricultural and Mechanical College, of Greensboro, for each of the years 1901
and 1902, in addition to its standing appropriation” (p. 1). As such, the total
appropriation for the college for the given years was $2,500 plus $5,000, or a
total of $7,500.
As a basis for this suit, the state treasurer asserted that, “the act of the
General Assembly passed during its session of 1895 repealed the act of 1891 by
implication, and that the standing appropriation to the said Agricultural and
Mechanical College for the Colored Race is only $5,000 per annum” (p. 2). The
state treasurer not only wanted to reduce the appropriation to $5,000, but also
withheld $2,500 of the appropriation because he viewed that his predecessor had
mistakenly overpaid the college. Therefore, he planned to pay the college only
$2,500 of its $5,000 appropriation for 1902.
The court closely reviewed the appropriations that had been passed
during the preceding decade. It found that the original $2,500 was intended for
organizational expenses (such as paying to establish the college) and that the
$5,000 appropriations that followed were for more specific purposes such as
buildings and maintenance. Not only were the appropriations intended for
different purposes, the court also found that the latter act “has no repealing
clause…If it was the intent of the Legislature…to appropriate $5,000 annually…in
addition to the amount appropriated in the organic [original] act, then it has done
so clearly and without doubt. But if it intended to make this to cover and in
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substitution for and to repeal the other, then we fail to find any expression or
suggestion to indicate any intent” (p. 4). The court considered not only the legal
basis for the argument, but also considered the practical nature of the
appropriations: “The former [the original $2,500] would be totally inadequate to
meet the future needs of the institution…With this increase of property and
progress in promoting one of its institutions of learning and usefulness…we
would not be justified in holding that the Legislature intended to deprive it of that
sum of money” (pp. 4-5).
This case possesses a unique quality among most of the other cases in
this study—a vigorous dissent in the court opinion. One justice (with another
concurring) wrote that “the error in the judgment of the court below is so clear” (p.
5). He wrote that the original $2,500 appropriation was intended for start-up
expenses. Furthermore, he states, “The law, it is true, does not favor implied
revocations; but whenever a statute in a different manner makes provision for the
same thing provided for in a former statute, the former statute is repealed” (p. 5).
In this case, the court settled the distribution of power between the
treasurer and the college—and between the treasurer and legislature, for that
matter. It is uncertain whether the college’s role in serving minority students was
a reason that the treasurer objected to the funding. While history is full of
examples of racial strife during this period, it is also a fact that many other
institutions faced similar questions from state officials. Although it is impossible
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to rule out race as a motivator, the context of other cases makes such an
argument more difficult to make.
Cincinnati (City) v. Frank J. Jones (16 Ohio Dec. 343, 1905)
Cincinnati is a case similar to others in which we see a government official
challenging the ability of a public university to spend money in a certain way.
The case highlighted a conflict between the city solicitor who claimed that the
college was spending taxpayer funds improperly, particularly considering the
university’s status as a city college. The court considered issues such as the
propriety of taxpayer funds being used to construct a president’s home, the use
of a president’s home, the purpose of a city college, and the standards for its
management.
The University of Cincinnati had a comprehensive mission. The court
notes that it had over one thousand students and its departments included “a law
college, a medical college, an engineering college, and technical school and
colleges where general academic training is given” and even an athletic field (p.
2).
The university planned to construct a president’s home for several
reasons: “’building will be occupied by the president…where he can meet the
various faculties and committees thereof and directors and other officers of the
university and the students, and confer with them upon university business and
affairs, and as a place where college receptions may be held, and for the many
hospitalities incident to the president’s functions’” (p. 2). The college also noted
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that the president’s home being located on campus would be, “’advantageous…
in order that the students and affairs of the university may at all times be properly
guided and superintended’” (p. 2). This logic is relevant even today, and it is
interesting that even more than a century ago that colleges viewed presidents’
responsibilities as not simply the academic management of the institution but
also student affairs and even fundraising.
The city solicitor saw no such advantages and argued much differently.
He “contends that our university differs from all other American universities, in
being a municipal university; that as such institution, being part of the
municipality of Cincinnati, its government and the powers of the city and
university board pertaining thereto are regulated by statute, and that in the
construction of the statutes pertaining to such universities…we must apply the
same rule which is applicable to other municipalities and their institutions” (pp. 45). The relevant statutes included language that directed a municipal entity to
levy taxes only to pay for “the chief work of such university, college or institution
[that involves]…the maintenance of courses of instruction” (p. 5). In summary,
the city solicitor viewed the city college as very similar to any other city service
and thus subject to the same rules and expectations.
The court faced two issues—did the university’s board control the
institution’s expenses and was the construction of a president’s home an
appropriate expense? The court pointed to the statutes authorizing the
university’s existence. That statute outlines that the university’s board of
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directors “’shall have all the authority, power and control vested in, or belonging
to…property and funds, given, transferred, covenanted or pledged…[and] may
provide all the necessary buildings, books, apparatus, means and appliances
and may be all such by-laws, rules and regulations concerning the president’”
and other staff (p. 5). As such, the court ruled that “the scope of the university
therein described does not differ from that of any other university” (p. 5). The
court explained that “the occupation of these houses by the president and
professors was shown not to have been for the private benefit only of those
parties but to make it more convenient for the transaction of college business and
for closer intercourse with the student body” (p. 4).
However, the court’s ruling did not rest solely with its legal finding. After
all, a court might have read the above legal defense but still deferred to the city
solicitor’s judgment that using tax revenues to pay for a president’s home was
just as improper as, for example, building a home of the city’s director of
maintenance or a city council member. To justify the construction of a
president’s home, the court reviewed the history of higher education. The court
reflected upon how students lived in the same buildings as their professors and
staff members during the middle ages. The court also commented on modern
European and American universities which “consist of the scholars’ rooms,
fellows’ rooms, warden’s lodgings, president’s chambers, library, chapel, etc.
From the beginning, the corporations and the owners of Harvard College have
considered the college to be a community of teachers and students housed and
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fed in the college, living in college buildings” (p. 4). In researching and
considering these issues, the court took the questions about what powers the
university should have and diligently researched the topic in its attempt to arrive
at a fair decision. As a result of the court’s decision, the university was able to
construct the president’s home.
This case differs from many others in this study, as it did not rely on the
court’s interpretation of a state constitution to help inform its decision. The court
considered not only the city statutes but its interpretation of what appeared to be
in the best interest of the university. Furthermore, the court’s reliance on the
history of higher education was a compelling factor in how it crafted its ruling.
Regents of the State University v. Trapp, Auditor (28 Okla. 83, 1911) and
Peebly v. Childers, State Auditor (95 Okla. 40, 1923)
These two cases are discussed concurrently because they are so closely
related and the details relevant to this study are quite brief. Despite the brevity,
the two cases address critical questions of power and to what extent a governor
has the authority to change an institution’s appropriation after the legislature has
approved it and when he signs into law other parts of the appropriation.
In Trapp from 1911, the conflict arose when the university asked the state
auditor to process payments for a general (and, based on court records,
noncontroversial) expenditure for the State University at Norman. The auditor
refused to pay the expense because “there are not sufficient funds appropriated
to pay the same” (Trapp, p. 3). The court could not articulate the auditor’s logic
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because, quite curiously and without explanation, the auditor failed to provide
any additional information. The court explained that the auditor believed he was
correct in failing to pay the expense because, even though the expense was
authorized by the legislature and signed by the governor, the governor reduced
the appropriation upon signing the bill into law. The court stated that, “It appears
that the Governor…was of the opinion…that he was authorized thereby not only
to approve or disapprove any item in toto, but to reduce any item or items to a
smaller sum than approved by the Legislature” (p. 3). We might think of this as a
modern-day line item veto attempt, except that the governor was not vetoing the
appropriation, but rather attempting to reduce it. In total, the legislature approved
$285,810 and the governor attempted to reduce the university’s budget by about
$94,800, or approximately one-third of the total appropriation.
The court’s record does not provide a justification for the governor’s
actions. In the governor’s State of the State Address, which was presented to
the legislature the same month as the court decision, Governor Charles Haskell
referred to progress being made in higher education. We may infer that the
governor was attempting to be thrifty with public funds based on his statement
that, “the economy of Oklahoma has been the result of curtailing unnecessary
expenditures, notwithstanding that we have liberally provided for education,
charity, and beneficial, development” (Haskell, 1911, p. 11). Court records show
the details of the governor’s wide-ranging reductions. For example, he attempted
to reduce funding for 34 full professors from $55,750 to $48,450. Likewise, he
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attempted to reduce funding for 14 associate professors from $19,250 to
$14,250. He made similar cuts in many other areas, including the elimination of
summer school.
The court ruled that, although it was confused by the governor’s actions, it
did not have the power to authorize the expenditures that the university sought:
“since he was without authority thus to approve the bill, his sanction of parts of
the bill was ineffectual to give those parts the force of a law. Whether, if the
Governor had understood his powers relative to the bill differently he would have
approved the whole bill, including those items disapproved by him because in his
judgment they were excessive, can only be conjectured” (p. 11).
In Peebly v. Childers, the set of facts are very similar, although the case
occurred more than a decade later and with a different governor (J. C. Walton).
The legislature had passed a $700,000 authorization for the University of
Oklahoma for 1923-24 and $720,000 for 1924-25, which the governor “after the
final adjournment of the Legislature drew a line with red ink through each of
these sums and then wrote…’Approved in the sums of $500,000 only, and
$500,000 only,’” thus reducing the budget for each year by about 30 percent (p.
3). In a brief biography maintained by the University of Oklahoma, it is noted that
Governor Walton attempted to make political friends and, “To earn patronage
from conflicting factions [within the legislature], he made appointments to
positions in state government and higher education. For example, at the
University of Oklahoma, Walton sought gubernatorial favors from the Board of
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Regents, the president and faculty. Walton sought to reorganize the institution
on a political basis and pressured University President, Stratton D. Brooks, to
resign” (University of Oklahoma, n.d., pp. 1-2). The same article notes that
Walton was impeached and removed from office in 1923 due to “’illegal collection
of campaign funds, padding the public payroll, suspension of habeas corpus,
excessive use of pardon power, and general incompetence’” (p. 3). It is
speculative to assume that Walton reduced the appropriation as a political ploy or
because he was a crook, but it is not an unreasonable speculation.
The court ruled—as the Board of Regents requested—that “the action of
the Governor complained of was unauthorized by the Constitution and the effect
of such action was to leave the entire sum appropriated by the Legislature for
salaries and maintenance in full force and effect and available for the payment of
warrants properly drawn and presented for payment” (p. 3). The court also
referred to the governor’s actions as “an unauthorized and futile gesture and
wholly ineffectual for any purpose” (p. 7). As such, the funds were reinstated as
passed by the legislature and the college was able to make payments as it had
wished.
It may be tempting to dismiss these cases as unimportant in the context of
this study. After all, the evidence suggests that this conflict resulted (at least in
part) from a governor who (in Trapp) was incompetent and (in Peebly) was both
corrupt and incompetent. Therefore, one may argue that this case is less about
higher education and more about incompetence or political corruption. However,
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the fact remains that these were serious conflicts that highlighted a power
struggle between the university and the governor (and perhaps between the
legislature and the governor). It was the court that settled these important
disputes. In Trapp, the court could find no justification to support the college’s
argument, whereas the court that heard Peebly did so. This highlights the fact
that courts can make different rulings when confronted with seemingly
comparable cases. For example, in Peebly, a different court (perhaps the one
that ruled on Trapp) could easily have ruled differently and shifted the power
back to a governor (Haskell or any future governor).
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Section 2: The Power to Manage Land Grant Funds

H. Melgard, Treasurer of the Board of Regents of the University of Idaho,
Plaintiff v. John W. Eagleson, Treasurer of the State of Idaho, and Clarence
Van Deusen, Auditor of the State of Idaho, Defendants (31 Idaho 411, 1918)
Two cases heard by the Supreme Court of Idaho within months of each
other highlight a university’s concern that state officials were not properly
handling land grant funds. As will be noted in many cases, including this one, the
arrangement that Congress determined would be most efficient in administering
land grant funds is that each state’s treasurer would be responsible for the
disbursement of any funds to universities. In Melgard, the University of Idaho
challenged how the state treasurer, John Eagleson, treated those funds.
The conflict arose after Eagleson deposited $50,000 of land grant income
into the state’s general fund instead of into a restricted fund that was designated
for land grant income. Only funds from the restricted account were guaranteed
to be directed into the University of Idaho’s coffers. Furthermore, Eagleson
refused to disburse the $50,000 to the University. The University complained
that the treasurer had misdirected the funds into the general fund, that he refused
to pay the funds to the University as directed by law, and that the treasurer
endangered future receipt of federal funds because the University would be
unable to report to the federal government how the federal funds were being
handled.
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The court’s brief opinion states unequivocally that Eagleson lacked the
power to deposit the grant funds into the state’s general fund nor could he
withhold the funds from the university. The court described the treasurer’s role
as follows: “the state treasurer, to whom the fund is transmitted by the Secretary
of the Treasury, has, with reference to this fund, a mere clerical or ministerial
duty to perform, that is, to pay over the fund immediately to the treasurer of the
board of trustees, in this case the board of regents, upon their order” (p. 3). The
court further clarified that “the state auditor has no duty whatever to perform with
respect to this fund and no authority over it” (p. 3).
Eagleson’s motives are not explicitly stated, but he directed $50,000 in
land grant funds to be deposited into the state’s general fund rather than in a
restricted account as required by the state constitution. Court documents do not
always reveal the motivations behind why a person makes a certain choice. As
such, we do not know why Eagleson took this action. Was Eagleson attempting
to exert control over a state university, or to improve the state’s own finances by
funneling land grant funds into the state’s general fund? The answer to those
questions is unclear. The implications of the case are evident, however. By
declaring that a state treasurer and auditor have “clerical or ministerial” duties
regarding these funds, the court declared them to be nearly powerless in matters
regarding the distribution of land grant funds. If the court had decided differently,
or at least had not been so clear that the treasurer and auditor were without
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significant power, higher education in Idaho—particularly for the land grant
institutions—could have been constrained financially.
Evan Evans et al., as State Board of Education and Board of Regents of the
University of Idaho, Plaintiffs v. Clarence Van Deusen, Auditor, and John
W. Eagleson, Treasurer, of the State of Idaho, Defendants (31 Idaho 614,
1918)
Although this case appears initially to be a victory for the state auditor and
treasurer, the decision—although not a technical win for the university—clarified
policies that ultimately protected the university from state interference. This case
addressed an issue very similar to what we saw in Melgard, which was decided
only a few months earlier. Perhaps still skeptical that the state treasurer and
auditor would handle land grant funds properly, the University of Idaho again
sued both officials because the university argued that land grant funds were
being deposited into the state’s general fund.
The auditor explained to the court—to the court’s satisfaction—that the
funds were indeed not being designated as general fund monies. The auditor’s
explanation is highly technical and the details are not relevant to the scope of this
study. In summary, the auditor used the general fund as a temporary holding
place until the grant funds could be transferred to a proper restricted fund. One
might consider this to be a victory for the auditor and treasurer. After all, the
court endorsed their method of accounting for the land grant funds. However, we
must keep in mind several factors. First, we know from the Melgard case that the
court viewed the auditor’s role as clerical and ministerial. Therefore, even with
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this ruling that endorsed the auditor’s accounting tactics, one should not have
expected the auditor and treasurer to have gained significant power in the
management of these funds. But, the court went a step further in Evans and
clarified how the funds must be managed: “it was expressly indicated that these
funds are not a part of the appropriation made by the act. Nowhere in the act is
there any provision that funds belonging to the various institutions…shall be
transferred to any other fund in the treasury” (p. 4).
The case’s result is not inconsistent with the victory that the university
enjoyed with Melgard. The court, although it permitted the accounting
maneuvers that the university found unpalatable, affirmed that the land grant
funds belonged to the university and that the auditor and treasurer were
performing clerical duties in managing them. Furthermore, the court clarified that
even if the funds were erroneously placed into the state’s general fund, they were
still not subject to appropriation and legislative interference.
State Ex Rel. Koch, Relator v. Barret, State Treasurer, Respondent (26
Mont. 62, 1901)
This case reveals a power struggle between the state board of education
and the state treasurer and attorney general. The state treasurer and attorney
general not only argued that the state board of education lacked the power to
spend money and questioned how the money was spent, but they also raised a
critical question about how the land grant funds were generated such that—if
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they had succeeded—would have derailed the federal land grant funding system
in Montana.
The case originated after the state treasurer refused to pay a $1,500
expenditure that was funded by land grant revenues. The treasurer outlined
three arguments regarding why the board was not eligible to claim the funds.
The first is that “’the legislature of the state of Montana has not appropriated the
sum demanded’…and ‘that there is no law authorizing the payment to the relator
of moneys derived from the leasing of lands donated to the state’” (p. 3). This is
similar to arguments we see in several other cases—that is, the idea that state
institutions could only expend funds that the legislature specifically appropriated.
The treasurer relied upon the land grant’s stipulation that the funds would be
allocated “in such a manner as the legislatures of states may prescribe” (p. 4).
The court found, however, that this language did not imply that the legislature
must appropriate the funds. The state constitution established a “’state board of
education…[that would receive] from the government of the United States, any
and all funds, incomes, or other property to which any of the said institutions may
be entitled, and to use and appropriate the same’” (p. 4). Therefore, the court
ruled that there were sufficient mechanisms in place to ensure that funds were
being spent in accordance with federal and state constitutional guidelines and
without the legislature needing to be involved.
The treasurer’s second argument is “that the claim for which the warrant
was drawn is a claim against the state other than for a salary of compensation of
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a public officer, and should be audited and allowed by the state board of
examiners and paid upon the warrant of the state auditor” (p. 4). The court
clarified that the land grant funds constituted a trust and that, as such, the
expenses were drawn upon the trust rather than acting expenses of the state.
Therefore, they were not subject to the same level of auditor review as an
ordinary state expenditure. The court further clarified the role of the board of
education by stating that Congress “intended that this board should be clothed
with the special and exclusive power of executing it free from the limitations and
restrictions of the constitution as to the expenditure of ordinary revenues from the
state. It may be that a different rule would apply to expenditures of any moneys
appropriated by the legislature out of the revenues of the state to supplement the
revenues derived from the trust fund thus left to the control of the board” (p. 5).
With this language, the court went beyond the scope of this one question by
ruling that no land grant proceeds were subject to state oversight and delineated
and differences between federal and state funds.
The final argument that the court addressed is the most unusual—and the
most important among the three issues that it considered. Based on what we
have seen in other cases, the process of receiving land grant revenues involved
Congress allocating the land, the state selling the land, and then the funds being
deposited into an institution’s permanent endowment fund. This happened in
Montana as well but with one critical exception. Instead of selling the land, the
land was typically leased. The lease income provided revenue which was
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deposited into the permanent fund, but the treasurer objected to the fact that it
did not constitute a sale of land: “the attorney general argued that congress, in
making the grant, intended that it should become available only after a sale of the
lands granted, and an investment of the moneys thus obtained, so as to provide
an income from interest” (p. 5). The court noted that most of the revenues were
derived from leases, so if a university could not benefit from lease income, the
result could have been devastating. The court interpreted Congress’ wishes
more loosely than the attorney general, however. “We think the manifest
intention of congress was to create a permanent endowment…and to require that
the revenues derived therefrom should be faithfully applied to the support of the
institutions created…So long as this intention is carried out, we think it makes no
difference what mode is adopted. The grant was made in view of conditions
existing at the time, and others which might arise” (p. 5). Addressing the specific
topic of leasing, the court said, “It certainly could not have been intended that
lands which could not be readily and speedily sold, but which…could be made to
yield a revenue by a system of leasing, should be allowed to lie idle and
unprofitable until such time as the state could sell them, and thus comply with the
strict letter of the grant” (p. 5).
This case’s outcome was important for public higher education in
Montana. That a treasurer and attorney general would challenge the board of
education’s ability to raise money through land grant funds, that they would argue
that the legislature must appropriate any expenditures, and would contend that
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the treasurer must audit expenditures demonstrates a clear rift between the
universities and state officials. For each element of the conflict, the court ruled in
the board’s favor, even admitting that it was unnecessary to “comply with the
strict letter of the grant” (p. 5). The court’s findings, particularly related to its
comfort with not adhering to the “strict letter” of Congress’ land grant
requirements, demonstrates a clear deference to the universities, permitting them
much broader power than the treasurer and attorney general argued that they
should have.
State Ex Rel. Haire, Relator v. Rice, as State Treasurer, Respondent (33
Mont. 365, 1906) and Montana ex rel. Haire v. Rice, State Treasurer (204
U.S. 291, 1907)
These cases are discussed together, as the latter case represents an
appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court in 1907 from a Montana Supreme Court ruling
in 1906. At issue is a law that the Montana legislature passed in 1905—“An Act
to enable the Normal School Land Grant to be further utilized in providing
Additional Buildings and Equipment for the Montana State Normal College” (p.
8). As the act’s title suggests, the legislature proposed to use lands sold as a
result of the federal Enabling Act as a way to help provide bond funding for
buildings and equipment at the state’s normal school: “The funds realized from
the sale or leasing of the lands granted by the United States to Montana for State
Normal School purposes (100,000 acres), and the licenses received from permits
to cut timber on any of said lands, are pledged as security for the payment of the
principal and interest on such bonds, except such sums as may be necessary to
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pay other bonds heretofore issued” (p. 8). As discussed in other cases in this
study, the Enabling Act was a federal act that Congress passed that allowed
states to sell or lease lands in order to generate revenue to help fund educational
enterprises in their respective states. Congress charged the states to develop
regulations for the expenditure of those revenues in their constitutions, but was
not prescriptive regarding the method for how lands would be sold nor the use of
the funds. In compliance with the Enabling Act, the Montana state constitution
outlined the use of any resulting funds: “’The various funds shall be respectively
invested under such regulations as may be prescribed by law, and shall forever
remain inviolate and sacred to the purpose for which they were dedicated…The
interest of said invested funds, together with the rents from leased lands or
properties, shall be devoted to the maintenance and perpetuation of these
respective institutions’” (p. 9).
Due to the apparent conflict between the Montana constitution (which
required that any revenues be invested into permanent endowment funds) and
the legislative act (which allowed funds to be used to pay for construction-related
bonds), the state treasurer refused to pay a bill from an architect who was
working on a construction project at the state university. The treasurer contended
that the state constitution’s word on the matter was final—that is, that funds must
be invested in the university’s permanent endowment fund. The university
argued that the Enabling Act offered the legislature latitude to spend the money
as it saw fit, and also supported its argument by stressing the ambiguity in the
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state’s constitution which outlined that funds could be expended as “prescribed
by law” (p. 9). In other words, the university contended that the legislature simply
prescribed the law that the constitution allowed it to prescribe.
The court ruled that, despite the apparent ambiguity, it was the
constitution’s intent that should be given the greatest consideration. The court
chided the legislature for attempting to take the lands from the state and give
them to the legislature: “The lands were granted to the state of Montana, not to
the Legislative Assembly. The legislature may say how the lands shall be held;
but it is the state which holds them, which has title to them. It is the state which
says what shall be done with the lands…The state may act through its
constitutional convention, and, if it does so, such action is conclusive. In the
absence of constitutional provision, it may act through its legislative assembly”
(p. 10). The court admitted that the constitution provided the legislature the
ability to make regulations, but those regulations could not overrule the intent of
the constitution which was to ensure that the revenues were deposited into the
permanent endowment.
The legislature and the normal school were undeterred by the state
supreme court ruling above. In early 1907, they argued the case at the U.S.
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court considered many of the arguments above
and they do not bear repeating. The justices found that the Enabling Act
authorized—and required—the state to hold a constitutional convention. The
convention was charged with making two important decisions relevant to this
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case: the constitutional convention established a legislature and it established
regulations regarding the sale of the lands at issue. The court declared that, “the
natural inference is that Congress, in designating the legislature as the agency to
deal with the lands, intended such a legislature as would be established by the
constitution of the State…It follows, therefore, that in executing the authority
entrusted to it by Congress the legislature must act in subordination to the state
constitution, and we think that in so holding the Supreme Court of the State
committed no error” (p. 7). The Supreme Court—as was the case for several
other state courts and decisions cited in this study—had greater faith in the
continuity of the state constitution than in the legislature, given that it was subject
to political pressures and its members’ whims. This case therefore clarified that
the legislature lacked the power to change the use of land grant funds. As a
result, the college’s flexibility with spending the funds was significantly inhibited.
State, Ex. Rel. Spencer Lens Company, Relator, v. Edwin M. Searle, Jr.,
Auditor, Respondent (77 Neb. 155, 1906)
Spencer addresses whether the legislature should appropriate funds that
had federal origins. Beginning in 1887, the United States Congress authorized
$15,000 per year to be given to the University of Nebraska “for the purpose of
carrying on experimental work in agriculture” (p. 1). From 1887 to 1899, the
federal government disbursed the funds directly to the university. In 1899, the
state legislature passed a law that specified that the state treasurer would be the
custodian of university funds. Funds continued to be funneled to the university
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(from the federal treasury to the state treasury and then to the university) without
incident until 1906, when the state auditor refused to authorize a payment for the
university’s agricultural station. The state auditor argued that, “the legislature
had not specifically appropriated the fund in question for that purpose” (p. 2). In
other words, the auditor was willing to authorize expenditures only with legislative
approval, regardless of whether the funds came from the state, the federal
government, or some other source.
The auditor declared that the statute that prescribed him the power to
control university expenditures was the same statute that had designated the
state treasurer as the custodian of university funds. The law outlined that “the
fund having been paid to the state treasurer, it cannot be expended by the board
without a specific appropriation thereof by the legislature” (p. 2). The auditor
noted that courts had held in similar cases not involving higher education that,
indeed, state agencies could spend funds only following legislative authorization.
The court considered this argument but ruled that the university—not the auditor
or treasurer—retained the power to execute the expenditures. The court
articulated two arguments. First, the court relied on the state constitution, which
stated that “’lands, money, or other property granted, or bequeathed to this state
in educational purposes, shall be used and expended in accordance with the
terms of such grant, bequest, or conveyance’” and that the “board of regents not
only has the power to accept the fund in question, but it is also its duty to do so
and to expend it for the purposes declared by the acts of congress” (p. 2). The
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federal government had provided these funds to the university, and it was
therefore within the university’s purview to spend those funds according to the
federal government’s guidelines. With its ruling, the court clarified that the
regents and the university—not the state auditor or the legislature—had the
power to decide how to spend outside grant funds.
Second, the court clarified that Congress’ funds for the agricultural station
were never the property of the state at all: “[the property] never belonged to the
state. It was donated by the United States to the experiment station of the
university for a specific purpose…It never was, and is not now, any part of the
funds of the state” (p. 2). This ruling’s implication is that the state had no
constitutional justification to interfere in these matters, nor did the court feel that
the state even had a property interest because the money came from a source
outside of the state treasury.
Although the court’s decision was relatively brief, its implications are
compelling. The court deferred to the university regents and clarified the powers
given to them by the state constitution. This case’s attention-grabbing element is
how the court viewed federal funds. Due to federal legislation that established
funding for projects such as Nebraska’s agricultural station, significant sums of
money were being funneled from the federal treasury to states universities. With
its ruling, the court established that the state had little or no power the dictate the
expenditure of those plentiful federal funds. The university was accountable and
had to answer to the federal treasury and to Congress—not the state legislature

68

or state elected/appointed officials. The court’s ruling ostensibly allowed the
university to function outside of the realm of state control and oversight when
federal funds were involved. This case not only addressed the balance of power
between the state and university, but also clarified the distribution of power
among Congress, the state, and the university.
Regents of University of New Mexico v. Graham, State Treasurer, et al. (33
N.M. 214, 1928)
At issue in this case is Congress’ intent regarding how land grant funds
were to be allocated to the University of New Mexico. A disagreement ensued
when the state treasurer, state auditor, and state commissioner of public lands
challenged the university’s plan to use certain oil drilling royalties to pay general
university budget obligations rather than being invested into the institution’s
permanent endowment. The university justified this plan based on an act passed
by the state legislature, so the treasurer, auditor, and commissioner challenged
how both the university and the legislature wished to process the royalties.
The specifics of the case address the differences between the Ferguson
Act and the Enabling Act. The Ferguson Act, passed by Congress in 1898,
provided 65,000 acres of land for the University of New Mexico and 100,000
acres for an agricultural college. With this act, lands belonging to the university
could only be leased rather than sold. Congress further stipulated that any funds
deriving from such leases or from products such as oil “shall constitute
permanent funds, to be safely invested, and the income thereof to be used
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exclusively for the purposes of such University and Agricultural College” (p. 4).
The Enabling Act, which Congress passed in 1910, provided 200,000 acres to
the University of New Mexico. However, the language in the latter Enabling Act
was vague compared to the Ferguson Act. The Enabling Act allowed that the
grant to be used “’for University purposes’” (p. 3). Since the Enabling Act
appeared to permit the funds to be directed into accounts that were not
permanent endowment accounts, the legislature felt justified in prescribing that
the funds be used in that way. In 1917, the legislature passed a law that stated,
“The permanent funds created by this act shall consist of the proceeds of sales of
lands…and the income and current funds created by this act shall consist of
rentals, sale of products from lands, interest on permanent funds, and anything
else other than money directly derived from sale of all state lands so granted” (p.
4). It is important to note that the “act” referred to above actually refers to both
the Ferguson and Enabling Acts—that is, the legislature designed the law so that
the apparent flexibility afforded by the Enabling Act could be applied to the
Ferguson Act. The legislature reasoned that the Ferguson Act’s requirement that
funds be placed into a permanent endowment was overridden by the Enabling
Act.
The university was understandably content to follow the legislature’s
direction. Although the court documents do not specify the amount of money that
was at stake, we can assume that the amount of oil royalties from 100,000 acres
was substantial—or at least had the potential to be. The objection raised by the
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aforementioned state officials indicates that, between the act’s passage in 1917
and June 1925, the royalties were indeed deposited into general income funds
with the university as the legislature directed. But, beginning in June 1925, state
officials directed the royalties into the college’s permanent endowment fund. The
central question that the court considered was, “Was it competent for the
Legislature to direct the placing of oil royalties in the income fund?” (p. 4).
The legal arguments each side presented are straightforward. The
university argued that “there is nothing in…the Enabling Act fairly to indicate that
Congress intended to restrict the right of the Legislature to adopt such policy as it
might see fit with reference to the proceeds from the lands granted; that it was
entirely competent for the Legislature to establish or not to establish an
endowment” (p. 5). Furthermore, the university reasoned that it would have been
illogical for Congress to have established similar land grant programs, with one
restricting revenues to be deposited into a permanent fund while the other
prescribing lax restrictions. Therefore, the university pushed for the looser
restrictions outlined by the Enabling Act to be those that guided policy.
The treasurer, auditor, and commissioner of public lands disagreed with
this interpretation, and it was an opinion that the court supported. Regarding the
notion that the Enabling Act cancelled the permanent endowment provisions set
forth in the Ferguson Act, the court rejected the argument: “The later [act] is
additional and supplemental. In the earlier [act] Congress had plainly pursued its
historic policy of endowing Universities and Agricultural Colleges. Having once
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expressed that purpose, it was deemed unnecessary to reiterate it…Of course,
Congress could have reversed such policy. But it did not” (p. 7). But, the court
did not stop with this ruling. It also declared that the Ferguson and Enabling Acts
were so intertwined that they must be considered together. In doing so, the court
found that even funds deriving from the Enabling Act—which Congress had not
technically designated as creating a permanent fund—must still be invested into
the university’s endowment. Therefore, all of the revenues associated with these
two acts were ordered to be directed into the university’s permanent endowment
fund.
Just as we see in some of the other cases, the court provided a
justification for its actions beyond simply the legalities, explaining that, “It
[Congress] declared an enforceable trust, realizing that the new state might not
be willing patiently to await the growth of its University endowment, but might be
tempted by present needs to dissipate its patrimony” (p. 7). What are we to
make of this comment? The court was clearly attempting to ensure that federal
resources were used appropriately, but it also demonstrated a keen awareness
of the importance of long-term resources. Although we can speculate that courts
were slightly more trusting of universities to make good decisions about
resources than they were of state legislatures, there is nonetheless a skepticism
that is apparent in this and other cases. The court articulated that there needed
to be legal mechanisms in place to protect universities from focusing on shortterm needs and wants rather than their long-term viability.
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State Ex Rel Board of University and School Lands v. McMillan, State
Treasurer (120 N.D. 280, 1903)
This case addressed the question of whether a university’s board could
make policies that circumvented the intent of federal regulations regarding the
use of land grant proceeds. The conflict arose following the refusal by D. H.
McMillan, North Dakota’s state treasurer, to allow the university to invest $60,000
of land grant proceeds in bond funds. The bonds were issued by Valley City
College, a public university. The university’s plan involved purchasing its own
bonds with its endowment, which was no doubt a creative attempt to circumvent
the requirement that land grant funds be invested in permanent endowment
funds.
The case’s importance centers on two issues. The first is whether the
university’s board had the power to invest the permanent endowment fund as it
saw fit or if that decision was subject to legislative control. Second, if the board
was required to seek legislative approval, would the purchase of bonds meet the
requirement that an investment of the permanent endowment fund be safe and
prudent?
The North Dakota constitution stipulated that, “the legislative assembly
shall pass suitable laws for the safe keeping, transfer and disbursement of the
State of North Dakota school funds” (p. 3). The state constitution further defines
the investment of funds: “the moneys of the permanent school fund and other
educational funds shall be invested only in bonds of school corporations within
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the State of North Dakota, bonds of the United States, bonds of the state of North
Dakota, or in first mortgages on farm lands in the state” (p. 3). The state
treasurer argued that the plan for a university to purchase its own bonds using its
endowment fund was unconstitutional: his “refusal to pay is based entirely upon
the contention that the board is without legal authority to invest this fund in the
kinds of obligations proposed as an investment” (p. 7).
The constitutional limitation on the types of investments that a college may
make is interesting and reflects a conservative investment strategy. The court
probed the university about the bond’s riskiness, indicating that it was concerned
about the bond’s riskiness: “Defendant [the board] alleges that he has no
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief whether the interest and
income accumulating from the sale, rental, or lease of the Valley City Normal
School lands will continually increase, or as to whether said interest and income
would be adequate to the payment of the interest on said bonds at all times, or
whether said interest and income will be sufficient to provide a sinking fund for
the payment of the principal at maturity” (p. 8). The court expressed concern
about Congress’ intentions with the land grant funds, stating that, “By the mere
acceptance of the grant the honor of the state was pledged to the observance of
the obligation of the trust; that is, to maintain the permanency of the trust fund
and to use the interest thereof” (p. 11).
One might assume that the university’s bonds could be considered the
bond of a school corporation (an investment permitted by the state constitution),
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but the court clarified that normal school bonds are not school corporation bonds.
The court considered whether the college’s bonds are bonds of the state (and
thus eligible for purchase) as the case’s “decisive question” (p. 13). Curiously,
the court answered that the bonds are bonds of the state. Unfortunately for the
university’s board, however, classifying the bonds as a state bond violated the
constitution in a different way—this time, because the issuance of the bonds
would violate the state’s debt limit.
The court’s ruling acknowledged the difficulties facing higher education
and universities’ access to funding and the broader implications of the decision:
“The members of this court are not unmindful of the embarrassment to this and
other state institutions which are looking to moneys derived from these proposed
loans for buildings and improvements which will follow our decision. This will be
temporary, however, and is of small consequence compared to the permanent
injury which would be done to the people of the state if the courts…should fail in
the performance of their duty” (p. 20). The court thus echoed a theme that we
see in other cases—the court was very hesitant to endorse policies that
endangered the long-term viability of universities, and courts consistently viewed
having a stable endowment as an indicator of that long-term health.
It may be tempting to describe this case as one that primarily addressed
the nuances of constitutional law, bond requirements, and accounting rules.
Although the case certainly contains those elements, the implications are broader
than that. The court even acknowledged such in their closing comments in the
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previous paragraph. This case tells the story of how colleges were engaged in
very creative activities—perhaps even desperate ones—to help literally build the
institutions that they wanted to create, expand, or improve. There is nothing in
the case that demonstrates that the court—or even the treasurer, for that
matter—was angered by these efforts. In fact, we see a court struggling to make
the correct decision and expressed guilt because its decision was not one that
the university’s board wanted.
Another compelling element of this story relates to how conservatively
permanent endowment funds were invested. At least in North Dakota, this was
not a state that gambled with its institutions’ endowments. Regardless of the
motivation, the courts and many state officials were concerned about the
permanency of endowment funds. We can assume that this reflects not only the
seriousness with which these officials performed their duties but also the
appreciation that they had regarding the adequate long-term preservation of
funds.
State ex rel. University of Utah v. Candland et al., State Board of Land
Commissioners (36 Utah 406, 1909)
In this case, the University of Utah and the Utah legislature were aligned
with each other. It was the state attorney-general that objected to an agreement
regarding how land grant funds should be expended. In the state’s constitution,
the court noted the relevant language regarding how land grant funds should be
accounted for and expended: “’the proceeds of the sale of said lands, or any
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portion thereof, should constitute permanent funds to be safely invested and held
by said state, and the income thereof to be used exclusively for the purposes of
such university’” (p. 9). The University of Utah is mentioned in the 1894
constitution, and is referred to as part of “’the public school system’” and that land
grant funds “shall be used exclusively for the support and maintenance of the
different institutions…in accordance with the requirements and conditions of said
acts of Congress” (p. 9). The requirements outlined in Utah’s constitution are
very similar to those found in other states included in this study.
In 1909, the state legislature passed a law that allowed the State Board of
Land Commissioners—which oversaw the sales of land for university land grant
purposes—to lend $250,000 from the land grant fund to the University of Utah for
the construction of a building. The law outlined that the university would then pay
back the fund using revenues from additional land grant sales. The attorney
general sued, arguing that the law was unconstitutional and that it did not meet
the guidelines that Congress and the state agreed upon. The court considered
three key issues: whether the law authorizing the use of land grant funds for the
building construction was appropriate, the definition of an “investment” (which is
closely related to the first issue), and whether the university is equipped to act as
a public entity or as a separate corporation. A further complication is that the
state’s constitution only permitted the state to go into debt a maximum of
$200,000 for general obligation bonds. If the court decided that the loan from the
land grant fund to the university was unconstitutional and thus was an obligation
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of the state—rather than of the university—then the act would be unconstitutional
because of the state’s aggregate debt limit requirement.
Given the clear language in the state’s constitution prohibiting the
proposed use of land grant funds, how did the legislature and the university
justify their plan to use land grant funds for construction? First, the university
contended that it was a “corporation existing as such under the laws of the
state…[and] legally competent to enter into contracts and to incur debts” (p. 9).
As an independent corporation, the university could not only retain the power to
incur debts, but also would not have the state’s debt limit requirement as a
potential burden. Second, the university argued that loan of $250,000 from the
land grant fund constituted an investment not unlike how endowment funds
would be deposited into any other type of investment instrument. If the land
grant act was, as described, “created for its [the university’s] use and benefit,”
then it stands to reason that such a loan satisfies the investment requirement (p.
9). Third, the university argued that, “in order to declare a legislative act void
upon the ground that it is in conflict with the Constitution, such conflict must be
very clear” (p. 10). In other words, the university argued that the court must
satisfy a very high standard before voiding the act that gave it the power to
receive the loan.
The first two arguments are particularly important to higher education.
The notion that a state university could act as an independent corporation in Utah
may have drastically changed the relationship between the state and the public
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university system. In responding to this argument, the court dismissed the idea:
“The university is a state institution…since the members constituting its
governing board are all appointed by the governor with the consent of the senate,
and the board regularly reports to the governor. Moreover, the corporation holds
all the property in trust merely. In fact the property belongs to the State of Utah.
We think no one will seriously contend that the corporation styled the ‘University
of Utah’ has the power or authority, without the consent of the State of Utah, to
dispose of any property” (p. 11). The court was also concerned by what would
happen if the university failed or if its property were wiped out: “The real
ownership is thus the state, and if the university property is destroyed from any
cause it is the loss of the state, and the burden of restoring it must, as it should,
fall upon the state at large” (p. 11).
Regarding the second argument, the court argued that university’s plan to
use land grant funds as a loan was a clear constitutional violation. Although the
university contended that the loan for a building constituted an investment just as
one might invest endowment funds in stocks, bonds, or similar instruments, the
court was unconvinced, holding that land grant funds “shall constitute a
permanent school fund, the interest of which only shall be expended for the
support of said schools” (p. 9). In other words, the constitution’s language and
purpose were both clear.
We see again a court that is encouraging a great deal of restraint in the
use of these land grant funds, and it did not accept the creative ways in which the
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university wished to circumvent legal requirements. The court’s ruling effectively
declared that land grant funds were conservatively restricted only to investments
as outlined by the state constitution, which meant that Utah’s plans to expedite
the construction of buildings were quashed.
The State of Washington on the Relation of Arthur W. Davis, et al., Plaintiff,
v. C. W. Clausen, as State Auditor, Respondent (160 Wash. 618, 1931)
This case is unusual in that it concurrently addresses how a college may
access both state and federal funds. The conflict began when the state auditor
refused to pay expenses to the State College of Washington because the funds
had not been appropriated by the legislature. The funds involved two state funds
and three federal funds—Morrill, Hatch, and Smith-Lever.
The court considered the two types of funds separately. The state funds
involved the college’s collection of fees from students that are outside of the
typical collection of tuition, “including class room fees, dormitory rental, summer
school tuition, and money derived from the sale of live stock dairy products, etc.”
(p. 3). One might assume that these funds would have attracted low levels of
controversy, as they were designed to cover specific expenses that the university
incurred. The treasurer saw the issue differently. Regarding these revenues—
which were deposited with the state treasurer—the treasurer “bases his
refusal…upon the ground that there are no legislative appropriations covering the
same, and that, for this reason, no lawful authority exists which justifies him in
issuing the warrants” (p. 3). The treasurer pointed to language in the state
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constitution that stated, “’No moneys shall ever be paid out of the treasury of this
state, or any of its funds, or any of the funds under its management, except in
pursuance of an appropriation by law’” (p. 4). Therefore, he argued that the
college indeed possessed the power to collect the revenues and to deposit them
with his office, but that the college lacked the power to follow through and then
spend the money.
The court considered several earlier cases that related to the expenditures
of funds held by the treasurer, and found that, “Money which the law directs shall
be paid to the state treasurer, is received by him as such, and must be
accounted for by him in that capacity…money paid thereunder to the state
treasurer…cannot be disbursed, save pursuant to some lawful appropriation by
the state legislature, and within the period limited by law” (p. 5). The court
interpreted the constitution and statutes very strictly. By viewing the fee charges
as revenues to the state and not distinguishable from any other revenues,
whether property taxes or income taxes, the court significantly curtailed the
power that a college had to exercise discretion regarding how it expended those
revenues.
One might assume that the court would necessarily view the handling of
federal funds for the Morril, Hatch, and Smith-Lever funds differently from state
funds. After all, these were external funds that other state courts cited in this
study found should expended at the primary or sole discretion of the recipient
college. The Washington Supreme Court disagreed. The court noted that, when
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the legislature initially approved the receipt of federal funds from Congress, it set
up special accounts into which the land grant proceeds would flow. Furthermore,
the court noted that “it is interesting to observe that the legislature, after
establishing these funds, has always made specific biennial appropriations
therefrom…thereby indicating that, as to these funds, the legislature deemed
regular appropriations necessary to withdraw moneys therefrom” (p. 6). Indeed,
the court relied on legislature’s consistent appropriation of federal funds to the
college as a precedent that the legislature intended for the funds to be treated as
such.
The college countered that the funds were clearly accepted from the
federal government in order to establish a college, and that the college must by
necessity be granted the power to manage the funds within its purview. One of
the court’s key sources of logic is that the power to manage funds should rest
with the legislature because the legislature had been a trusted source of
management in the past. The court said it might have felt differently “if the
legislature was endeavoring to divert from the use of the college any of the funds
with which we are here concerned,” but it found no evidence of such activity (p.
8).
Curiously, the court admitted with federal Hatch Act funds that the funds
“may be…handled without the intervention of any state officer, other than the
board of regents. Money to be paid by the government under this act, need not
be paid to the state treasurer, but, if paid to him, should be appropriated by the
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legislature as other funds so paid to that officer” (p. 8). With this logic, the court
ruled that the legislature, not the college, had the power to appropriate funds and
that the college was subject to legislative discretion with such appropriations.
Although the case’s facts differ from other court cases, the Washington
Supreme Court arrived at a much different conclusion than other courts in this
study. The court viewed the legislature as an ally that could assist the university
and could be trusted rather than an adversary. This was unusual. The court’s
deference of power to the legislature and appropriations was also highly unusual
given the outcomes of other court cases in this study.
Wyoming ex rel. Wyoming Agricultural College v. Irvine, Treasurer of the
State of Wyoming (206 U.S. 278, 1907)
Wyoming is a case that the U.S. Supreme Court heard following an appeal
after the Wyoming State Supreme Court ruled. This case’s central issue—and is
one that was not only important to the state of Wyoming but also to all land grant
colleges and states in which they were located—is whether Congress’ land grant
funds were allocated to the states or to individual colleges. Put differently, was it
the state legislature or the individual college that determined the expenditure of
the funds? These are important questions and are ones that other courts in other
states heard. However, this case possessed an unusual twist. Wyoming
Agricultural College viewed itself as the sole beneficiary of land grant funds that
were being funneled from Congress to the states. Presumably, it made this
argument—that it controlled its funds, not the state—in order to help promote its
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survival, as the state legislature had voted to revoke the institution’s charter and
reallocate the land grant funds (as well as other funds, no doubt) to the University
of Wyoming. Wyoming Agricultural College objected, arguing that only their
institution was entitled to the funds.
Whether the college’s argument regarding this matter was a desperate
effort to save itself is unclear, although we can surmise that they made the most
compelling political and legal arguments possible. That the case made it to the
U.S. Supreme Court suggests that the court viewed this as a compelling and
unanswered question. The court reflected upon Congress’ language in the land
grant legislation, and found that “It is so obvious that these appropriations are
made to the State and not to any institutions within the State, and that the States,
acting through their legislatures, are to expend the appropriations in accordance
with the trust imposed upon them” (p. 5).
The U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling had important implications for the
balance of power between the states and colleges, but the state supreme court’s
case considered other important matters that, although were confined to
Wyoming, were critical to the development of higher education in the state.
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Section 3: The Power to Control the University

The State of Florida, by W. H. Ellis, Attorney-General of Said State Upon the
Relation of F. B. Moodie, Fred L. Stringer, A Trustee of the University of
Florida, and the City of Lake City, a Municipal Corporation, Relator, v. N.P.
Bryan, A.L. Brown, Nathaniel Adams, P.K. Yonge, and T.B. King as the
State Board of Control, Respondents (50 Fla. 293, 1905)
Out of all cases selected for this study, this case from the Florida Supreme
Court highlighted a conflict that had the most dramatic of consequences—the
closure of several public universities. In 1905, the state legislature enacted a law
that began with “An act to abolish” and went on to list several institutions: the
University of Florida, West Florida Seminary, White Normal School, East Florida
Seminary, South Florida College, and Florida Agricultural Institute. The act
included orders that colleges’ properties “are hereby declared forfeit and revert to
the State of Florida” and that “all continuing appropriations heretofore made to
said institutions…are hereby revoked” (p. 4). It also specified that “all Boards of
Trustees, managers and officers of the several institutions…are hereby
abolished” (p. 5). In essence, the legislature ordered these institutions to cease
to exist entirely.
In their places, the legislature directed new institutions to be established.
The act established a Colored Normal School, the University of the State of
Florida for men, and Florida Female College. The legislation specified the terms
of the new boards and directed how new sites would be selected for the
respective campuses. It also created a new “Board of Control” which “shall have

85

jurisdiction over and complete management and control of all the said
institutions” (p. 7). The act also mandated academic and entrance exam
standards for the University of the State of Florida, requiring that, “No student
shall be admitted to the University of the State of Florida who has not passed a
satisfactory examination at some High School and through the twelfth grade as
now established, or some other institution of learning having an equivalent of
instruction to the twelfth grade” (p. 9).
The universities, led by the state’s attorney general, filed suit to void the
legislation. The attorney general presented several reasons why the act should
be declared unconstitutional: that the legislature was constitutionally prohibited
from relocating campuses, that it could not impose academic requirements
(completion of twelfth grade and standardized exams), that the Board of Control’s
make-up was not supported by the state constitution, and other various technical
legal objections. The precise nature of the legalistic arguments is not relevant to
this discussion. The crux of the conflict is that the legislature, obviously believing
that drastic changes needed to occur within Florida higher education, sought to
exercise its power and, in many senses, begin with a blank slate.
To summarize the court’s finding, it ruled in favor of the legislature in all
respects. The court was clear and decisive in its language, stating, “The trustees
are made by this legislation the agents of the State to collect and disburse
property appropriated by the General Government to the State for a public
purpose. There is not and never was any private property in the trustees in the
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funds. They were derived from government…The only right they have to it is by
the legislation of the State” (p. 20). In other words, the trustees did not act as
independent agents—their powers were given to them by the state legislature
and could just as easily be (and would be) taken away. The court carried this
theme throughout its decision. It articulated that higher education’s power in
Florida emanated from the legislature. The court saw that the ultimate power to
determine university policy rested with the legislature, and that the trustees were
merely acting as agents of the legislature and were subject to legislative
directives.
The court also responded at length regarding one of the attorney general’s
contentions, which was that the imposition of academic standards violated
students’ constitutional rights. The court strongly disagreed, writing, “It surely
cannot be seriously contended that the Legislature has not the right to provide
proper educational qualifications for admission to the college so created by the
Legislature… Undoubtedly some judgment and discretion were to be used by the
Legislature in prescribing these qualifications, otherwise how could the institution
in question be a college?” (p. 21). Regarding the attorney general’s statement
that the legislature was not authorized to relocate institutions, the court
responded that the decision was up to the legislature such that it was “in their
[the legislature’s] judgment, would be best for the interest of the State” (p. 23).
The court recognized the importance of its decision, ending its ruling by
saying, “We have realized the gravity of the questions involved and of their far-
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reaching consequences to the public, and have reached the conclusions
announced herein only after the most thorough investigation and mature
consideration” (p. 35). There were the very immediate implications—the closure
of established institutions and the creation of new ones. But, there were also
long-term implications about what entity controlled the plight of higher education.
In this case, it was clearly the legislature. In addition, it should not be lost on us
that the governing board for the new higher education system in Florida was
named the “Board of Control.” As a new governing body, the Board of Control
exercised new power over new institutions.
The State ex rel. Harry T. Heimberger, Appellant, v. Board of Curators of the
University of Missouri, a Corporation; D. R. Francis, J. C. Parrish, C. B.
Rollins, Samuel Sparrow, John H. Bradley and G. L. Zwick, Constituting a
Majority of Members (268 Mo. 598, 1916)
Whereas many cases address important issues such as financial
resources, this Missouri case is one of the few during this time period that
addressed conflict and power that touched so directly an institution’s academic
program. Although the nature of the case is different from others, it nonetheless
provides a compelling example of how state legislatures and public colleges
often had different agendas.
In 1915, the legislature amended the state’s statutes to add language that
affected the University of Missouri as follows (italics are the additions): “The
leading objects of said colleges shall be to teach such branches as are related to
agriculture and mechanic arts and mining, including military tactics, and without
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excluding other scientific and classical studies, in order to promote liberal and
practical education of the industrial classes in the several pursuits and
professions of life” (p. 6). Furthermore, the legislature added bachelor of science
degrees in several areas of engineering. In effect, the legislature’s actions
demonstrated that it—not the university faculty, administrative personnel, or
board—had the power to add and remove programs and degrees.
The college responded in a way that is unsurprising. The university and
its board “simply deny the power of the General Assembly to exert over them any
authority of the kind implied by the enactment of this amendment. Their position
is that they are independent of the General Assembly and not subject to its
direction or control in any manner or degree” (p. 7). This is a compelling
conflict—the legislature desired to add degree programs and perhaps even
change the nature of the educational experience by adding a version of a liberal
arts curriculum, while the college steadfastly denied that the legislature had any
power to do so. The court recognized the level of the conflict by pointing out that,
“Counsel [for the university] does not mince words. In plain language they state
their contention to be that…the board of curators [represent] a separate and
distinct department of the State Government, over which the General Assembly
has no power and with which it has practically nothing to do except make such
appropriations as it deems proper” (p. 9).
The college did not simply argue that this conflict was about the power to
control the curriculum, but also that the legislature’s actions could cause
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irreparable harm to the college. For example, it argued that the “establishment in
the School of Mines and Metallurgy…would be and is quivalent [sic] to the
disestablishment of the College of Agriculture to the extent to which students who
might pursue those studies in the last named school might or would be attracted
to the School of Mines and Metallurgy” (p. 8). In other words, the college worried
that the new programs in mining could overshadow the traditional programs in
agriculture and could diminish the College of Agriculture’s mission. On this point,
the court noted that there was no constitutional prohibition against establishing
new programs at colleges, and furthermore argued that the college’s contention
was untenable because adopting the college’s “interpretation would be to
preclude the General Assembly from providing in high schools and normal
schools courses of study overlapping that freshman students in the University”
(p. 8).
The college also observed that the establishment of the new programs
was not needed. The court also rejected this claim and dismissed the relevance
of whether the programs were needed or unneeded, stating that the constitution
“forbids nothing in the way of aid and maintenance. It simply commands that aid
shall be given under stated conditions. The argument falls with the incorrect
interpretation upon which it is based” (p. 9). Put differently, because the state
constitution did not specifically forbid the General Assembly from establishing
new programs at the university, it necessarily retained the power to do so. The
court later states this clearly: “The legislative power, subject to the limitations
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contained in the Constitution, is vested in the General Assembly of the State of
Missouri. The General Assembly retains all legislative power not expressly or by
necessary implication forbidden it by the Constitution” (p. 10).
Heimberger’s outcome is compelling because it addressed significant
issues related to governance. Whereas other courts in this study often deferred
to colleges when constitutional language was unclear, the Missouri Supreme
Court ruled quite the opposite—that the lack of specificity in the state constitution
meant that the power to govern rested with the General Assembly, not the
university or its board. Had other courts made similar rulings, the landscape of
higher education could be much different today.
State ex rel Prchal, Appellants, v. Dailey, et al, Respondents (57 S.D. 554,
1931)
Although Prchal is a case that was initiated by a taxpayer, the South
Dakota Supreme Court considered important issues and ruled such that it greatly
diminished the power of the system’s regents. In 1881, the state legislature
authorized the creation of normal schools for the purpose of instructing teachers.
The colleges were also authorized to “give instruction in the mechanical arts and
in husbandry and in agricultural chemistry” (p. 3). Given the growth in higher
education and changing demands/needs for college education, the regents
responded with the addition of programs: “the regents have prescribed additional
curricula for these schools leading to advanced degrees, have changed the
names of the schools designating them as colleges, and have established them
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as teachers’ colleges authorized to teach a college course and to train teachers
qualified to teach in the high schools and other institutions of higher learning” (p.
3). The taxpayer claimed that the regents assumed that they had more power
than they actually had been granted by the state constitution and by the
legislature. As a result, he sued, stating that their actions were unconstitutional
and that their power to make these changes should be rescinded.
The court considered three arguments that the regents made in support of
their continuing to award degrees and teach courses beyond those originally
prescribed in the legislation. First, the regents argued “that under the
Constitution…the ‘control’ of the institutions necessarily includes the power to
prescribe their curricula” (p. 4). The court reasoned that, even if the regents
have the power to control the curriculum, they must do so within the confines of
legislative authority. By so drastically changing the curriculum (albeit with noble
intentions), the regents essentially changed the character of the institution: the
colleges have been “created by the regents. There is no direct specific
legislation to effect that change, and since the regents have no power to
establish schools or colleges, their action cannot be sustained” (p. 4). The court
acknowledged that although the regents had “very broad powers in respect to the
curricula under their control, it is self-evident that they cannot by the exercise of
that power change their character” (p. 5).
Second, the regents argued that they should not be prohibited from their
curricular activities because they “have acted honestly and in good faith in an
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honest exercise of a discretion legally vested in them” (p. 5). The court
recognized that the regents had indeed acted nobly but, “If the acts are
unauthorized, the good faith in which they are performed cannot authorize them”
(p. 5). This ruling echoes sentiments other courts expressed about whether an
act can continue as accepted because it has become standard practice, even if it
is unconstitutional.
Third, the regents argued that the nature of teacher preparation education
had evolved with time, and so too must it be allowed to evolve in South Dakota.
They rejected the notion that they had constructed their own curricula outside of
legislative directive. The court methodically considered the history of what had
transpired during the three decades that had passed since the original legislation
authorizing the creation of normal schools in the state. It also consulted similar
events in other states. The court found that, in other states, “We have found no
case in which the raise in rank without legislation has been effected and
sustained by the court” (p. 5). Furthermore, the court argued that it viewed its
decision as ultimately protecting the graded school system. If a college that had
been established in support of grade school teacher education was usurped by
another college offering a similar teacher preparation program (whether the
intentions were noble or not), then the plight of grade school education in the
state may suffer. Ultimately, the court found that, “It is for the Legislature to
determine the educational policy of the state, not for this court or the regents” (p.
6). The use of the term “policy” is an important one here. The court did not seek
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to undermine the regents’ ability to conduct normal business, nor did the
legislature or a state official raise such a challenge. Instead, this case focused
on who has the power to create policy, and the court clearly sided with the
legislature: “These provisions [in the legislation] plainly fix the limits of the
powers granted the regents. We do not find anything in the legislation that can
fairly be said to delegate power to the regents to change the purpose, character,
or scope of any school under their control” (p. 7).
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Chapter Three:
Study Outcomes, Limitations, and Further Research

Study Outcomes
This study’s thesis is that courts helped regulate the balance of power,
and that this was necessary given the “wild experiment” that Blackmar suggests
characterized models for funding and governance for higher education. In
supporting this thesis, there are six themes outlined below that discuss the
relevance of this study to how we understand the history of higher education.
This discussion is not designed to repeat the observations made about each of
the preceding cases, but rather synthesizes the major points about them as a
group.
The power of evaluating a large group of cases is that we can more easily
identify themes or patterns. Within this collection of cases, we see patterns
emerge that enhance our understanding regarding how and why public
institutions developed as they did, particularly regarding how their relationships
with their respective states developed and changed. In fact, when considered
alone, one may draw conclusions about a case that are quite the opposite of the
conclusions that become evident when evaluating the group of cases as a whole.
Each of the themes below echoes a unifying point about the relationships
between public colleges and their states: state officials, including many courts,
were not content to allow higher education to chart its own course or with minimal
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supervision without at least raising significant questions. Regardless of whether
the court ruled in favor of the college or not, the fact that the questions were even
being raised indicates a pattern of concern with how higher education was
growing and developing.
Outcome 1: Cases were important; they carried significant implications for
higher education and impacted its development. Courts helped shape the
future of higher education.
These cases are full of rich details and fascinating information. With court
cases, we can come to understand both sides of an argument. Many U.S.
Supreme Court cases receive deserved attention, but state cases often do not,
particularly among higher education scholars. As this study shows, state cases
carried important implications for colleges. Had courts ruled differently in most of
the cases selected, issues such as power, autonomy, and control would have
evolved much differently in those states.
As we consider this outcome—that cases carried important implications—
let us first consider the cases that involved the management of federal land grant
funds. Land grant cases generally fall into two categories. The first category
involves cases such as Montana’s Koch v. Barret in which a state official
attempted (with varying levels of success) to influence how land grant funds were
spent, while the second category of cases such as New Mexico v. Graham
involved colleges’ attempts to utilize land grant proceeds for expenses other than
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investments in permanent endowments. Both of these issues merit further
discussion.
As we consider the first category of cases in which state officials
attempted to exercise control over federal funds, there is a common theme—that
state officials argued that legislatures should officially appropriate land grant
funds just as they appropriated non-federal (state) funds. If we reflect upon the
information presented in Chapter 1 about governments and their quest for
efficiencies, it is unsurprising that state officials challenged how colleges spent
money. After all, at the same time that colleges sought more money and greater
autonomy, states were eager with other state agencies to achieve greater
efficiencies and more oversight. The gap between what colleges wanted and
what states sought from other agencies was destined to create the kind of
conflict that we see in several cases.
In nearly all cases in this study, courts ruled that colleges—not their
respective states—had the ability to control how federal grant funds could be
spent. Although it is impossible to know how the higher education landscape
would have changed if courts had allowed state legislatures to assume a greater
role in appropriating those funds, we can assume that colleges would have had
fewer freedoms. There would likely have been practical considerations—that a
state legislature would have different spending priorities than the college—but
there was also a philosophical outcome of these cases. With these rulings, many
courts distinguished higher education as a special entity. Several courts used
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this issue as an opportunity to describe public colleges as dissimilar from other
state agencies and, as such, clarified that public colleges had special privileges.
The second category regarding federal grant funds evident from this
study—whether colleges could use land grant proceeds for current operations or
building construction rather than investing those funds into a permanent
endowment—also bears further discussion. Colleges, boards, and even
legislatures at times sought to circumvent this requirement with creative
maneuvers such as offering bond sales, with bonds being repaid using land grant
revenues. Courts unanimously rejected these efforts. Why was this important?
As a result of these rulings, public colleges no doubt had to defer expansion and
construction plans. Such financial requirements likely meant that plans to
expand numbers of students they could serve, the faculties they could hire, and
so on, prevented public colleges from growing as quickly as if they had gained
quicker access to the land grant funds. However, by deferring short-term
projects, the colleges’ balance sheets benefitted by being invested into
permanent endowment funds, which has certainly led to long-term benefits that
those institutions enjoy even today. Let us take the example the 1909 case of
University of Utah v. Candland. In that case, the university proposed to use
$250,000 in funds designated to be deposited into the permanent endowment
and instead construct a building. We do not know how the fund would have been
invested, but certainly the $250,000 would be worth several million dollars now,
more than a century later. Furthermore, it is possible that the building
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constructed in 1909 would no longer be useful (or in existence) today, whereas a
permanent endowment would have generated investment returns and revenues
for the past century.
Outside of land grant fund management, we also see many cases that
involve legislatures’ or state officials’ attempts to exercise other financial and
governance controls. An early assumption as this study began is that courts
would be generally consistent with how they treated colleges—that is, that they
would either have been deferential to colleges or deferential to state officials or
legislatures. Although there are critical cases that demonstrate courts’ deference
to colleges, others were clear victories for state officials. On one extreme, cases
in Michigan and Minnesota clearly delineated the powers between colleges and
states, with great and enduring deference to public colleges. At the opposite
extreme, Missouri’s Heimberger established that colleges lacked the power to
establish their own curriculum, while Florida’s Ellis clarified that trustees were
primarily designated to execute the will of the legislature. What can we make of
these extremes? One lesson is that it is difficult to discuss “public higher
education” and conflicts and power during this time period in general terms.
Court rulings were based on many factors, including constitutional provisions
(discussed in Outcome 3 later in this chapter), but also on individual states’
circumstances that are difficult to generalize. These cases reveal that the way
that states and public institutions would interact during the decades that followed
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were unique to each state thanks to how differently courts interpreted matters of
power.
Beyond that observation, we must take note that courts settled matters
that were critical to how higher education developed. The courts’
aforementioned rulings in Michigan and Minnesota assured that public colleges
would enjoy autonomy to set their own agendas for years to come. There are
also compelling stories about how power was settled between the extremes. In
Kentucky, although the Barker ruling did not assure public colleges that they
would enjoy complete autonomy, it weakened the legislature’s power to meddle
in public institutions’ budgets. In Ohio, we saw the court certify that the
University of Cincinnati was indeed—for the lack of a better term—a “real”
college that should be allowed to function like one with a presidential home and
the permission for faculty and staff to engage in professional development. In
Florida, the court permitted the immediate closure of several public institutions,
no doubt changing the higher education landscape in that state. These cases
carried compelling short-term and long-term implications for each of the public
institutions in each state.
Outcome 2: Decisions were often about short-term growth vs. long-term
investments. At the heart of many cases was a strong ambition on the part
of public colleges to grow. Courts were more concerned about long-term
viability.
The theme of growth is most prevalent in the cases related to land grant
disputes. In most of the selected cases with this theme, we see colleges (often
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with the endorsement of the state legislature) attempt to use land grant funds for
either current budget expenses or for construction projects. In response, state
officials (typically treasurers or auditors) challenged their ability to do so, usually
due to state constitutional requirements that stipulated that land grant proceeds
must be deposited into institutions’ permanent endowment funds. As public
colleges grew, they obviously needed larger budgets and additional space for
student housing and for academic needs. Land grant funds were regarded an
easy source for them to receive revenues to suit their needs.
As colleges were fixated on short-term needs, state officials—and
courts—were noticeably focused not only on following appropriate laws but also
on colleges’ long-term needs. For example, in North Dakota, the court conveyed
its concern about using land grant funds to buy bonds because it wondered what
would happen if the university defaulted on the bonds. Some courts even
expressed regret that their decisions would disappoint colleges, but they were
more concerned with the long-term benefits of having healthy endowments.
These cases highlight important points about the history of higher
education. Colleges were eager to grow and to gain additional resources.
Based on the creative ways that some of their funding programs were designed,
it is safe to say that colleges were aware of the regulations but sought loopholes.
The evidence shows that legislatures were often complicit in these plans. So, as
this study discusses issues of power, the power struggle was often not between
a legislature and a college, but rather between other state officials (auditors,
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treasurers, and attorneys general) and a given college. Legislatures were eager
to see their public colleges thrive. In addition, if a college had more immediate
access to land grant funds, it would have taken pressure off legislatures to
appropriate state revenues.
Outcome 3: The importance of state constitutions cannot be overstated.
State constitutions, often written in the 1800s when public higher education
was in its infancy, were incredibly important.
The notion that state constitutional provisions are important to higher
education is not a new idea. Hutchens (2009) observed that, “In seeking to strike
a balance between acceptable state oversight versus the need to safeguard the
authority of public colleges and universities to manage their own affairs, some
states rely on constitutional provisions to limit excessive state governmental
intrusion” (p. 271). What this study demonstrates is that constitutional provisions
were so important this early in higher education’s development. In the selected
cases, most of the constitutions being referred to originated in the mid to late
1800s; Hutchens (2009) notes that Michigan in 1850 was the first state with a
constitution that addressed higher education (p. 282). Blackmar (1890) finds that
states began seeking official support for public colleges even earlier than that
point. “After the Declaration of Independence the provisions relating to education
assumed a more decidedly political tone. Sentiments began to be expressed in
favor of universities, created, controlled, and supported by the State. The
colonies had received a new political baptism, and the ideas of sovereign States
began to grow and the national consciousness to awaken…there was added a
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new zeal for educated citizenship” (p. 24). The fact that state constitutions—
written before some states even gained statehood—would have such important
implications for higher education years later is remarkable.
In several cases, we see the importance of constitutional provisions,
whether they were strong, weak, or seemingly nonexistent. For example, in
Montana, the state supreme court relied on the state’s constitutional language in
Haire v. Rice to reject any use of land grant proceeds for purposes other than
endowment investments. In Kentucky’s Barker v. Crum, the court referred to the
state constitution to determine that the state legislature had overstepped its
authority by imposing requirements regarding how a public college could spend
its appropriated funds. Missouri’s Heimberger v. University of Missouri cited
constitutional language that, in the court’s view, gave the legislature greater
control of the academic program. These were important rulings but also indicate
that public colleges and states were exploring and arguing about issues related
to constitutional autonomy long before modern times and that these constitutional
provisions were critical in providing guidance to courts during this time period.
Outcome 4: Federal funds led to conflict. The introduction of federal
money into the system of higher education is a primary driver of conflict.
This was the most surprising observation in this study. The flow of new
federal funds into higher education beginning in the mid to late 1800s is welldocumented. However, the case law that followed implementation has not been
adequately explored by researchers. That the introduction of federal funds would
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represent such a common source of conflict is striking. This study reveals that
the source of the federal funds—whether from the Morrill Land Grant Act, the
Enabling Act, or other acts that primarily supported agricultural research—did not
really matter. Conflicts primarily arose in two ways—the disagreement over
whether legislatures must appropriate land grant funds and whether colleges
could utilize land grant income for current operations or construction rather than
endowment investing. This again is a benefit to studying several cases together,
as we are able to see common themes that developed in states that had much
different histories and institutions.
Whether land grant programs such as the Morrill Land Grant Act were as
transformational as some historians have argued is a matter of debate (Key,
1996 and Thelin, 2004). That being said, the introduction of federal monies into
a system that had previously not enjoyed such generosity generated a series of
conflicts across the system of public higher education. Whether the issue was
the legislative appropriation requirement or how to spend the money, these
conflicts were serious. They led courts in several cases to make clearer
distinctions between the power that a college possesses versus power that was
relegated to the legislature or to the state as a whole via its constitution. In other
words, even if we accept that land grants did not result in the grandiose, literal
building of colleges and universities, the introduction of the federal money into
higher education led to debates between colleges and states that would not have
materialized in that money’s absence.
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Outcome 5: State officials served critical roles. Their roles are understated
in the history of higher education; they pushed back when they saw
colleges expanding their power too far.
Out of the twenty-four cases in this study, nineteen placed colleges in
conflict with government officials such as state auditors, treasurers, or attorneys
general. Obviously, with these cases being so focused on financial matters, it is
not necessarily surprising that auditors and treasurers would be at the center of
the litigation. However, it nonetheless speaks to the advocacy roles that these
state officials viewed themselves as having.
One benefit to studying several cases is that doing so allows us to identify
patterns that are not obvious when reading one or two cases. After all, if one
reads a singular case, it may be tempting to discount the influence of an
individual state official and assume that they were motivated by personality
conflicts or by politics. Personality and politics were no doubt factors in some
cases. But, the fact that so many cases were instigated by state auditors,
treasurers, and attorneys general from different states leads us to conclude that
there were other factors. One’s motivation, particularly if they are an elected
politician, is difficult to ascertain. However, reading through the court cases
reveals that these officials expressed genuine concerns about colleges’ efficiency
and autonomy. No doubt, they were trying their best to navigate a greatly
changed landscape of governmental funding and influence.
Were these state officials interested in shifting power from the universities
to themselves or their offices? That was likely not the case. After all, in most
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cases that involved such officials, they were not seeking to retain direct oversight
of certain expenditures. Rather, they were working to ensure that colleges were
following regulations, so in that sense they were advocating that power be
redirected to other entities—often the legislature.
Outcome 6: The “Wild Experiment” lived up to its name. Many of the
conflicts we see are rooted in experimentation that had allowed colleges to
be established and/or grow by 1900.
Among the selected cases, virtually all of them dealt with a funding
component of one type or another. In 1890, Blackmar expressed
discouragement regarding the state of affairs related to higher education’s
funding model. He noted that “the facts before us show a vast amount of weak
and misdirected legislation in the management of the funds granted by the
Federal Government and the several States for carrying on institutions of
learning…There is one redeeming feature; the great majority of legislators in
States, seeing the profligate waste of school funds hitherto, are now rallying to
the support of State institutions, and are seemingly determined to redeem the
errors of the past by careful legislation in the present and future” (p. 38). He
proceeded to note that “the lawgivers of new States hastened to plant
universities, which had to pass through long periods of inactivity and meager
support…during which the handling of the funds, in many instances, was a wild
experiment” (pp. 38-39).
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As we reflect upon Blackmar’s comments and the cases in this study, the
pieces fit together quite well. As Blackmar stated, the environment in which
regulations were formed and colleges were built was highly experimental. It was
no doubt an exciting time when states wanted colleges to succeed and colleges
wanted the same. Nonetheless, following experimentation of this magnitude,
recalibrations and revisions were bound to be needed. The courts served as the
entities that determined how those recalibrations and revisions would be
implemented.
This study brings to light not only the experimental nature of higher
education funding mechanisms, but also illuminates how those experiments led
to power struggles. The most significant experiment included federal grants, and
we see numerous conflicts erupting due to how states and colleges had differing
interpretations of federal grant regulations. We also see in nearly every case that
conflict erupted and power was questioned because of experimental—or perhaps
youthful—financial arrangements between states and colleges.
Blackmar’s work highlights two concepts that we see prevalent in these
cases. The first is his point that there was weak legislation. Blackmar does not
explain in detail what he is referring to, but we certainly do see legislation leading
to a number of problems, and it often reflected what we may assume is a
misunderstanding of what the law permitted, particularly in cases that feature
conflicts about federal funds. It was often left to state treasurers and auditors—
and ultimately to the courts—to try to address such legislation. The second is

107

that state legislatures were becoming more active. Blackmar frames this activity
as “rallying to the support” of public institutions (p. 39). Indeed, we do see some
legislatures that rallied to support colleges, often using methods that state
officials and later courts found questionable or unconstitutional.
In summary, states were eager to expand higher education. There were
no examples in this study’s research that indicated that states were trying to
suppress higher education’s growth. Colleges and their leaders, one might
imagine, were even more eager to grow. In an industry where most public
colleges were fairly new—and even some states were quite new—there was a
healthy amount of experimentation. Was it wild experimentation, as Blackmar
suggests? Indeed it was. When we think of wild experimentation, we may
assume that it was careless, which would be inaccurate in this case. Instead, it
was experimentation that was wild in the sense that it was creative and
innovative. Experiments, by nature, involve successes, failures, recalibrations,
questions, and conflicts. We see many of those elements of experimentation in
the cases reviewed in this study.
Finally, Blackmar’s work combined with studying these cases supplies us
with very early insights into what issues were important for policymakers.
Blackmar surely was not the only person who recognized that these funding
models were experimental. Studying these cases confirms his observations,
though—that there were well-intentioned policymakers at both the federal and
state levels who genuinely wanted to strengthen higher education, but because
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they were conducting experiments, they often missed details or failed to be as
specific as they should have been. Likewise, colleges—also well-intentioned and
genuinely wanting to become stronger, larger, or more influential—became
overly ambitious in their quests to find new resources.
Study Limitations and Future Research
I once mentioned to Neal Hutchens, who kindly served as my independent
study professor two years ago, that condensing research on legal issues from
this time period into one semester’s independent study was unrealistic—that it
could honestly be one’s life-long project. Even with a dissertation that took much
longer than one semester to complete, I still believe that there is a substantial
amount of research to be done in this area. Many of these cases deserve their
own dissertations, or at least articles, as they individually were so important.
Although this study’s purpose was to evaluate the importance of these cases in
an aggregate form, it was nonetheless tempting to dig even more deeply into
several of the case’s stories.
One important study limitation is that many of us know from personal and
professional experiences that legal cases are not always the result of
professional conflicts, but also are personal in nature. Although court
proceedings provide a rich level of detail that I argue has not been adequately
explored in the past, they are limited, as there are human elements that are
generally not evident in these cases. For example, from some earlier research
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not related to this study, I learned that in Kentucky’s Barker v. Crum, while there
were certainly legal reasons that led to court proceedings, there were personality
conflicts between the university’s president and the legislature that certainly are
not explained in the court opinions. No doubt, there are other examples of this in
other cases. Although this study demonstrates that there are patterns of conflict
that may have little to do with personality, we cannot discount the importance of
human elements that influence these cases.
As discussed in the Introduction, this study intentionally is limited to a time
period of approximately thirty years. If we looked either thirty years prior to the
beginning point of this study (1870 to 1900) or thirty years later (1930 to 1960),
what would we see? Would we see similar conflicts, or would those conflicts
have been replaced by other issues? These are compelling questions. This
study’s importance could be contextualized by answering those questions, but as
they are outside of this study’s scope, this is a limitation.
The role of state constitutions is another source of curiosity. Given how
critical state constitutions were in helping courts to craft their rulings, there are
great opportunities for additional research that can investigate how and why state
constitutions’ language regarding higher education evolved. For example, who
was involved and how did the players even know what to write about higher
education given it was so new to many states? Many state constitutions’ framers
demonstrated a genius that benefits higher education even today.
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Finally, this study admittedly focuses on the pertinent issues that each
case addresses and the ensuing court rulings. There are many more angles that
one may explore with this type of research, such as how colleges reacted to
rulings, or how newspapers characterized the reactions to those rulings. This
study focuses on the cases themselves, but how colleges, state officials, and
others reacted is an interesting line of research. Having said that, one must
figure out how and where to draw the line with research. Charles Russo (1996),
once a University of Kentucky professor, noted that students can get “lost at the
talk of reporters, digests, and Shephard’s Citations” but that in such instances he
“sought to allay their concerns by pointing out that the legal method and other
forms of research serve essentially the same purpose: they are all interested in
arriving at a better understanding of the question at hand” (p. 34). It is likewise
the hope that this research—although it was not designed to cover every angle of
every case—has led to that better understanding that Russo discusses.
Final Thoughts
I note the importance of storytelling to historians. We often look to primary
source documents for perspectives on what occurred regarding a certain event at
a certain time. Often, we rely on newspaper articles, diaries, trustee meeting
minutes, and so on. These are excellent primary sources. But, case law is really
quite special. With many types of primary resources, it is more difficult to
understand the details of sometimes very complex issues. We may learn only
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one side of an argument from a diary entry, or we may know only the final
outcome of a decision when reading a newspaper article. Court cases are a rich
source of not only great levels of details, but also they tend to be very objectively
written and they lead us understand both sides of an argument. In that sense,
case law is an extremely valuable tool for research that I believe has been
underutilized. I should also note that court cases from this time period are
actually quite readable for a non-legal scholar. It seems that courts were
intentionally clear with how different arguments and logic informed their
decisions. They are fascinating and enjoyable reads.
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Appendix A
Cases are organized in the table below are ordered first by category, then
by state, and then by year in situations where there are multiple cases within one
state.
The Power to Control Public Institution Finances
Case Name

State

Year

Case Citation

Entity in Conflict
with College

The Indiana State Board of
Finance et al. v. State of
Indiana, ex rel. Trustees of
Purdue University.
Bosworth, Auditor v. State
University, et al.
Barker, President, et al. v.
Crum, et al.
Board of Regents of the
University of Michigan v.
Auditor General
State Board of Agriculture
v. Auditor General
State ex rel. University of
Minnesota and Others v.
Ray P. Chase
Lincoln University v.
George E. Hackmann,
State Auditor.
Agricultural and
Mechanical College v. B.R.
Lacy, State Treasurer
Cincinnati (City) v. Frank J.
Jones et al,
Regents of the State
University v. Trapp, Auditor
(28 Okla. 83, 1911)
Peebly v. Childers, State
Auditor (Regents of
University of Oklahoma,
Interveners)

Indiana

1919

188 Ind. 36

State Board of
Finance

Kentucky

1913

154 Ky. 370

State Auditor

Kentucky

1917

177 Ky. 637

Student

Michigan

1911

167 Mich. 444

State Auditor

Michigan

1914

180 Mich. 349

State Auditor

Minnesota

1928

175 Minn. 259

State Auditor

Missouri

1922

295 Mo. 118

State Auditor

North
Carolina

1902

130 N.C. 364

State Treasurer

Ohio

1905

City Solicitor

Oklahoma

1911

16 Ohio Dec.
343
28 Okla. 83

Oklahoma

1923

95 Okla. 40

State Auditor
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State Auditor

The Power to Manage Land Grant Funds

Case Name

State

Year

Case Citation

Entity in Conflict
with College

H. Melgard, Treasurer of
the Board of Regents of
the University of Idaho,
Plaintiff, v. John W.
Eagleson, Treasurer of the
State of Idaho, and
Clarence Van Deusen,
Auditor of the State of
Idaho, Defendants.
Evan Evans et al., as State
Board of Education and
Board of Regents of the
University of Idaho,
Plaintiffs, v. Clarence Van
Deusen, Auditor, and John
W. Eagleson, Treasurer, of
the State of Idaho,
Defendants.
State ex rel. Koch, Relator
v. Barret, State Treasurer,
Respondent
Montana ex rel. Haire v.
Rice, as State Treasurer,
Respondent
State, ex rel. Spencer Lens
Company, Relator, v.
Edwin M. Searle, Jr.
Auditor, Respondent
Regents of University of
New Mexico v. Graham,
State Treasurer, et al.
State ex rel. Board of
University and School
Lands v. McMillan, State
Treasurer
State ex rel. University of
Utah v. Candland et al.,
State Board of Land
Commissioners

Idaho

1918

31 Idaho 411

State Treasurer

Idaho

1918

31 Idaho 614

State Treasurer

Montana

1901

26 Mont. 62

State Auditor and
Attorney General

Montana

1906

33 Mont. 365

State Treasurer

Nebraska

1907
1906

204 U.S. 291
77 Neb. 155

State Auditor

New Mexico

1928

33 N.M. 214

State Treasurer

North
Dakota

1903

12 N.D. 280

State Treasurer

Utah

1909

36 Utah 406

Attorney General
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Case Name

State

The State of Washington,
on the Relation of Arthur
W. Davis et al., Plaintiff, v.
C. W. Clausen, as State
Auditor, Respondent
Wyoming ex rel. Wyoming
Agricultural College v.
Irvine, Treasurer of the
State of Wyoming

Washington

Wyoming

Year

Case Citation

Entity in Conflict
with College

1931
(filed
in
1930)

160 Wash. 618

State Auditor

1907

206 U.S. 278

State Treasurer

The Power to Control the University
Case Name

State

Year

Case Citation

Entity in Conflict
with College

The State of Florida, by W.
H. Ellis, Attorney-General
of Said State Upon the
Relation of F. B. Moodie,
Fred L. Stringer, a Trustee
of the University of Florida,
and the City of Lake City, a
Municipal Corporation,
Relator, v N.P. Bryan, A.L.
Brown, Nathaniel Adams,
P.K. Yonge, and T.B. King,
as the State Board of
Control, Respondents
State ex rel. Harry T.
Heimberger, Appellant v.
Board of Curators of the
University of Missouri, a
Corporation
State ex rel Prchal,
Appellants, v. Dailey, et al,
Respondents

Florida

1905

50 Fla. 293

State Board of
Control

Missouri

1916

268 Mo. 598

Student

South
Dakota

1931

57 S.D. 554

Taxpayer
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